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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY, BEGINS AND ENDS 
WITH THE SELF  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY, CONSCIOUSNESS THE INFLUENCE OF 
STRESS AND NEURAL CORRELATES 
 
Definitions and hypothetical theoretical constructs help us as starting points of empirical 
inquiry. 
 
FOREWORD 
 
The general purpose of this thesis is to study some fundamental, yet still open 
questions about autobiographical memory and related consciousness, the influence of early 
stress on the brain and autobiographical memory and its neural correlates. The goal is to 
make some progress in the definitory confusion and conceptual understanding of the 
relationship of these concepts starting from a developmental point of view. In the attempt 
to throw some light on what can fall under the sum of autobiographical memory-related 
themes, no overview or review of the existing answers will be given but rather, after 
extended research of the theoretical and empirical literature and own empirical work, a 
new clarifying point of view of the different phenomena. Considering the close 
relationship between the experience of the world, consciousness and autobiographical 
memory, the first question that becomes addressed in the theoretical part is how a child 
develops autobiographical memory and what Tulving entitles as associated ‘autonoetic 
consciousness’, a self-reflective mental state of awareness in time and space (Tulving, 
1985; 2002). The second question is concerned with how early childhood can form the 
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basal template in the buffering and facilitation of influences of stress on the brain and also 
on autobiographical memory, with psychogenic amnesia and altered autonoetic 
consciousness as a prototypical example. Autobiographical old memories are as a result of 
a high degree of anatomical interconnectivity and cognitive complexity most vulnerable to 
brain damage and other external and internal influences such as stress (Markowitsch, 1995; 
1999; 2000; 2002; 2003; Tulving and Markowitsch, 1998). The second empirical part of 
the thesis, is primarily focused on the fundamental research of autobiographic memory, 
and its neural correlates. The  different focuses within the chapters will bring up more 
questions for theoretical thinking and empirical research about the same complexity of 
which individuals are made of. 
 
1. MEMORY, AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF: Consciousness 
as a Continuum of States 
 
The chapter about autonoeitic consciousness responds on a renewed need to 
understand the phenomenon of consciousness and subjective experience. Science is still far 
from understanding the relationship between consciousness, self-consciousness and 
memory, especially autobiographical memory. We notice a growing dissatisfaction with 
the Cartesian separation of body and mind, together with the desire to give the 
phenomenon of subjective experience a place in science, especially from an integrative 
view of neurophysiological, philosophical and psychological concepts. Departing from the 
theorizing of Tulving (1985, 2002) about semantic and episodic memory and cognitive 
child development of memory (Nelson, 2002, in press; Nelson & Fivush, 2001), the basic 
idea is that different levels of development of the self relate to the phylogenetic 
development of different states of consciousness of being in the world. A gradual 
distinction becomes suggested: from 1. a rudimentary state of autonomic awakeness or 
unknowing consciousness as a biological adaptive function or “anoeitic” consciousness, 
towards 2. "knowing consciousness”, including “noeitic” and “autonoeitic” consciousness 
based on semantic and episodic memory systems. Evidence from the influence of brain 
damage upon autobiographical memory, and from the effects of stress on autobiographical 
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memory and related consciousness confirms the proposed framework insisting on the 
significance of different states of consciousness connected with different ways how the self 
becomes expressed in information processing and memory. 
 
2. NEUROVULNERABILITY: The Influence of Early Stress on the Brain, the Self 
and Autobiographical Memory 
   
This chapter primarily tries to contribute to the problem of different forms of early 
stress on the brain, and finally also on autobiographical memory and autonoeitic 
consciousness. I suggest that during early childhood, intimate care-taking constitutes the 
most important prerequisite for properly experiencing and processing stress later and in 
adulthood. Early, intense or chronic psychosocial stress may induce increased vulnerability 
on the neural and consequently also on the behavioral level. The phenomenon of what I 
call: neurovulnerability refers to a sensitivity or reactivity of the central nervous system at 
intracellular and biochemical to neurophysiological and psychological levels, facilitating 
the outbreak of severe and otherwise inexplicable functional disturbances. Psychogenic 
amnesia as a prototypical example is associated with an altered connection with the self 
and state of autonoeitic consciousness as an attempt to fulfil adaptive self-regulatory 
behavorial responses. 
 
 3. NEURAL CORRELATES OF AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY: Engagement 
of Lateral and Medial Prefrontal Areas in the Ecphory of Negative and Positive 
Autobiographical Memory. 
 
Autobiographical memory allows us to experience ourselves through subjective 
time associated with the awareness of the prior conscious event. Usually, autobiographical 
memory is affect-laden, whereby the main distinctions of affect are either of a positive or a 
negative valence. Based on previous (PET) findings on neural activations related to the 
ecphory of old autobiographical episodes a question of interest is whether in addition to a 
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likely engagement of frontal lobe regions other brain areas are implicated differentially in 
the processing of sad versus happy old autobiographical memories. This study relates to 
quite earlier studies, implicating in particular the orbitofrontal portion of the prefrontal 
lobes in a number of emotion-related processing patterns.  
This research about autobiographical memory will give us a deeper understanding 
of autobiographic memory, the interaction between emotion and memory and functional 
neuroanatomy. 
 
4. BI-HEMISPHERIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE RETRIEVAL OF NEUTRAL, 
POSITIVE, NEGATIVE AND STRESSFUL AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL EPISODES 
 
Autobiographical memory includes emotional memory ranging from neutral to 
negative, positive and stressful memories. Stress, as viewed here, is a quantitatively 
specifiable variable which almost superposes the positivity or negativity of an event. The 
inclusion of stressful memories is also considered to be important, since stressful incidents 
– if not coped properly – may lead to a block of autobiographical memory retrieval and 
may change the activity of specific brain regions most likely due to changes in brain 
metabolism such as an increased release of stress hormones and the block of receptor 
channels in memory sensitive areas (Markowitsch, 2002; 2003). Using functional magnetic 
resonance imaging (fMRI), the study addresses the question whether autobiographical 
memories of a positive, negative, stressful, or neutral character recruit similar or different 
neural networks. Obtained results will have implications for the classification of memory 
tasks with respect to memory systems and related autonoetic consciousness, the influence 
of different types of autobiographical memory, laterality and processes. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
MEMORY, CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF: 
Consciousness as a Continuum of States 
 
1. MEMORY, AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF IN 
DEVELOPMENTAL PERSPECTIVE 
 
James (1890) defined the basis of our identity as:„the knowing of the I who knows the 
bodily me, who has an image of myself and sense of identity over time." 
 
Introduction 
This chapter addresses some open questions about the self, development, 
consciousness and memory, especially episodic memory, and is meant to bring more 
clarity to the definitory confusion of these phenomena and especially the relationship 
between them. Though in the past many attempts were made for a deeper understanding of 
consciousness, science is still far from understanding the relationship between 
consciousness, self-consciousness and memory. Actually, a renewed need exists to 
understand phenomena of consciousness and subjective experience, especially from an 
integrative view of neurophysiological, philosophical and psychological concepts (Zeman, 
2001). 
Given the close relationship between the experience of the world, consciousness 
and memory, the first question that becomes posed is how children develop awareness of 
themselves as someone with specific semantic characteristics and as someone embedded in 
the dimensions of time and space. Although do not have the intention to solve the posed 
questions, the theorizing of Tulving (1985, 2002) about semantic and episodic memory and 
cognitive child development of memory teaches us to see how different levels of 
development of the self relate to the phylogenetic development of different states of 
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consciousness of being in the world. A gradual conceptual distinction is suggested, starting 
from 1) a rudimentary state of autonomic awakeness or unknowing consciousness as a 
biological adaptive function - "anoetic" consciousness and self-consciousness relying on 
implicit and procedural memory - towards 2) "knowing consciousness", first "noetic", then 
"autonoetic" consciousness. Noetic consciousness is based on semantic memory, whereas 
autonoetic consciousness is based upon a self-reflective state of self-consciousness within 
time and other contextual dimensions.  
In addition to actual theorizing, we also point to the importance of a first sort of 
'self-experience' or self-consciousness already apparent at an anoetic level. Children, 
already very early in development, develop an implicit awareness of their own organism 
and of its influence on the surrounding world. Even when they are still not capable to 
reflect on the perceptual origin of their own knowledge, they possesses already very early, 
implicit experiential information about themselves ('anoetic self-consciousness'). Without 
this level we are not able to understand phenomena as experiencing oneself without 
explicit remembering time and context. 
In the third part we continue to describe temptatively the neural correlates of the 
differential continuum of consciousness. 
 
1.1. FROM UNKNOWING CONSCIOUSNESS... 
 
Very early in development, children are aware of the presence of other human 
beings, through tactile, auditive, visual and other sensory experiences (Piaget, 1972). 
Babies smile „at" their mother, experience their emotions, but cannot observe or perceive 
them distinctly from the environment (Lewis & Brooks-Gunn, 1979). Even within a few 
hours of birth, infants display preferences for face-like stimuli (Goren et al., 1975, 
Gauthier & Nelson, 2001). Young children continuously look for social contact, warmth 
and intimacy to build a social form of comfort or agreeable situation. In this context, 
Nelson (2001) and Gauthier and Nelson (2001) found that at the age of 6 months, faces 
begin to be seen as a separate class of objects. For events with which infants are familiar, 
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like a face they have often seen, infants at 3 months show recognition memory after short 
periods of exposure (Pascalis et al., 1998).  However, even when there is a primary interest 
in the other person, anoetic consciousness is still essentially egocentric and without 
reflective awareness of that something. Anoetic consciousness is the simple awareness of 
the environment and the own organism almost exclusively based upon primary procedural 
and affective learning principles. At this level of consciousness, children "experience" 
themselves and the world without a reflective capacity. Little infants live in this 
affective/sensory-motoric relationship with the world and cannot refer to the feelings 
which they experience (Piaget, 1962). Also, the world may at first, at least partly, though 
being a point of controverse, be experienced as an extension of oneself. The caregiver 
functions rather as an external regulator of the children's' internal anoetic state of 
consciousness. He or she is actively involved in affective transactions with the infant 
influencing the growth of the brain structures involved in imprinting these affective 
experiences (Schore, 1994, 2000). These child-caregiver transactions result in early 
attachment relationships and are internalized and encoded at the level of procedural-
affective memory (Amini et al., 1996). Development proceeds then to more and more 
sensitivity for the spatial environment and oneself, through one's own activities 
(Butterworth, 1995). 
 
1.2. TO KNOWING CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
During the first three months of life children seem to show a spontaneous interest in 
the image of other children, without explicitly differentiating between themselves and 
others. Between the age of three and eight months, however, children already recognize 
their own image in the mirror on the basis of contingent cues between their own body-
movements and the movements in the mirror (Gallup, 1977; Butterworth, 1992). Children 
see themselves as the cause of the moving visual image. However, it has not yet been 
clarified whether babies know that the image is the image of themselves. Self-recognition 
arises at the moment the infant becomes personally touched by the recognition of him- or 
herself, not just by someone. 
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At about 8 to 9 months of age, children learn to manipulate or internalize the 
environment as an object of thought and begin to exhibit "joint attention" (Tomasello, 
1988, 1993). When the mother attends to her child as an object of interaction, children 
become stimulated to do so as well. Children develop an awareness of themselves as an 
object of observation for others, and thus develop this awareness of the self as an object as 
well. Neisser (1995) stated that even very young children appear to perceive themselves as 
real objects embodied and embedded in the world.  
This alteration of consciousness of oneself on a level of experience, towards the 
explicit 'awareness' of oneself as an object of attention, is dependent on a capacity to 
control attention (Posner, 1994). Between 13 and 15 months of age, research has shown 
that infants are also able to direct an adult's attention to a particular (distal) object and 
check whether the adult is attending to it (Tomasello, 1999, p. 65). That this requires 
knowing consciousness is convincing, while as Perner (2003) discusses, we never point out 
a particular object absentmindedly, and check whether another person attends to it. 
 
1.2.1. NOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND SYMBOLISATION 
 
At the age of one year, children show a remarkable shift in consciousness of how 
language may be used to locate and name objects and to express intentions (Carpenter et 
al., 1998). Within the theory of Piaget (1926) on the sequential appearance of different 
forms of mental representation., the earliest forms are called figurative; knowledge is 
assimilated in perceptual cues and the highest form of knowledge representation is the 
emergence of language, which he termed the "symbolic phase" (Piaget, 1926). Infants 
between 13-15 months of age, for instance, possess already a referential use of language 
(Perner & Dienes, 2002). While this use of language could first reflect imitated utterances, 
the genuine (non routinized) production of two-word should be a better indicator of what 
we understand by knowing consciousness (Perner & Dienes, 2002). 
Also, at about the age of 8-12 months, children begin to become aware of categorial 
features of the self and to locate objects (Butterworth, 1995; Lewis, 1979). Experiments 
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have shown that children of this age can now become aware of things, people, places and 
concepts that are not directly perceived (Piaget, 1926). They start to think about the world, 
their bodies and what they can do (Meltzoff, 1988); this co-incides, as we suggest, with an 
incepient functioning of the semantic memory system. The retrieval of this factual 
knowledge of the world, or semantic memory retrieval, is accompanied by what Tulving 
calls 'noetic consciousness', or the awareness of something in the world without temporal 
or contextual reference. 
 
The Self and the World 
Finally, between 12 and 24 months, children become more fully capable of 
differentiating between themselves and the environment (Kagan, 1981). Freud (1923) and 
Erikson (1963) saw this as the age where 'the I' or 'the ego' reach consciousness. Together 
with a heightened awareness for the distinction between the self and the world, children of 
about 18 months demonstrate the ability to recognize a picture of their face (Lewis, 1992), 
knowing that the picture belongs to themselves. Likewise then, children experience their 
feelings as distinctly personal. 
Recognition of oneself as an autonomous being, though being a point of discussion 
in developmental science, might be indicated by the observation that infants are able to 
remove a dab of odorless rouge from their nose using the mirror reflection as a guide. Self-
recognition in a mirror arises at the moment the infant becomes personally touched by the 
recognition of him- or herself, not just by someone. The capacity of independent 
movement of children at about 18 months of age stimulates the awareness of oneself as an 
independent subject (Butterworth, 1995; Neisser, 1995).  
According to Lewis (1992), this seems to begin at about the age of 20 months, 
related to the awareness of being able to have an effect upon the world. One's own name 
begins to become associated with the self as a point of reference. Children can verbalize 
their own situation and the events seen, and begin to define and to formulate the causes of 
their own activities, such as "I play, I want to do this alone", etc. At this time point of 
development, children appear to develop the capacity to anticipate the consequences of 
their own behavior and inhibit specific behavioral responses (Posner, 2001).
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The Other as Object 
Experiences become internalized, whereby the other becomes manifest as an object 
externally from oneself. Children evolve more and more as social beings, capable of 
interacting voluntarily with the environment. Johnson (1982) reported a positive 
correlation between self-recognition in a mirror and prosocial behavior, as when children 
comfort their mother when she pretends to be distressed. Around the age of two years, 
children appear to be able to imitate how it would be to be someone else (Meltzoff, 1990). 
A capacity to manipulate the relationship between the inner and outer world by strategies 
develops, such as wanting to impress another person. Children achieve intersubjectivity 
based on jointly constructed meaning and communication through verbal and nonverbal 
symbols as well as in reciprocal attunement (Trevarthen, 1992). This sharing of verbal 
communication and facial expression serves as an essential prerequisite for the further 
development of perspective-taking, self-consciousness, other-consciousness and memory. 
 
1.2.2. AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
Verbal consciousness gains importance as it allows to describe one's own person 
and the environment. The self as a unit with events from past history within a specific 
frame and context in the world, or the remembered self in time and space progressively 
occupies more space in one's thoughts. 
In studies on remembering, it has been concluded that between three and six years 
of age, children develop the ability to remember events as having been personally 
experienced (Perner & Ruffmann, 1995). But even if children of six can freely recall past 
events without much help, the question remains, whether they are really 'remembering' in 
the sense of Tulving's definition, thus within context and personal reflection or reference. 
Perner and Ruffmann (1995) suggested that children before the age of four years are not 
capable of encoding information in a personally explicit 'experienced' episodic way. 
 This means that before that age, children cannot be aware that something happened 
as a subjective experience which subsequently became integrated into the personal 
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perspective of the rememberer (Wheeler et al., 1997). According to Tulving (1985), 
children should not be able to remember events as experienced before the age of three. In 
correspondence, Tulving theorized that before that age children do also not possess 
autonoetic consciousness which refers to the self-knowing capacity to imagine existence 
within subjective time and space. Autonoetic consciousness namely has to be distinguished 
from episodic memory, while, as we will discuss further, it can also refer to the awareness 
of an image of an event in the present and in the future.  
When awareness is directed to the past in time and space, the recall of an episodic 
memory is required. Explicit memory is revealed when performance on a task requires 
conscious recollection of previous experiences (Schacter, 1987). Accordingly, this would 
not mean that children do not 'know' something about the past, including a great amount of 
details. But, the memories are without autonoetic consciousness.  
In line with the theorizing of Tulving, if a child sees another child on the street, it is 
able to recognize the child on a 'semantic knowing' level, but it does not remember the 
child in a visual sense, within the context of time and space inherent in the recollection of 
the past in an episodic way (Wheeler et al., 1997; Tulving, 2001). In work from Perner and 
Ruffman (1995), children before the age of about 4 or 5 years do not understand why they 
say that they have seen an object, for example, an object which was put inside a box (*). 
Recollective experience implies the understanding of the ´origin´ or the 'source' of their 
knowledge, which appears to develop later and is connected with autonoetic 
consciousness. Perner (1990), too, defined what they call 'experiential awareness' in 
association with the understanding of the origin of one's knowledge in perception, as a 
form of autonoetic consciousness.  
Eacott and Crawley (1998), however, only found evidence for episodic memory 
retrieval of children at the age of 21/2 years. Controlling for the fact that the information 
could come from other sources, they found that children at the age of two years 
remembered their sibling's birth, but significantly less well compared to those between 2 
years and 4 months and 3 years and 3 months of age. In this context, Terr (1988) observed 
that children younger than 2 years and 4 months of age and up to 3 years with traumatic 
experiences show replaying of the events with toys and avoidance and fears of memories 
connected with the trauma, whereas infants older than 3 years at the time of the traumatic 
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event are more likely to have verbal memories of the event. In these memories it is not 
sure, whether they remain on the level of semantically "knowing something" without 
involvement of autonoetic consciousness or whether they already implicate explicit recall 
within time and space.  
Also, in this context, other experimental studies have even shown that children can 
recall events at their 13th month of life (Bauer & Wewerka, 1995). In these studies, recall 
of events becomes expressed in deferred imitation whereby infants produce actions they 
have seen previously (Mandler, 1990; Bauer et al., 1994). Meltzoff (1995), however, found 
that at the age of 9 months, children appear able to imitate a sequence of actions, even after 
delays of 24 hours to 1 month. By 9 months of age, infants are capable of demonstrating 
ordered recall under special circumstances; nevertheless, this recall is quite fragile in 
general (Wiebe et al., 2001; Bauer et al., 2001). Several studies from the laboratory of 
Bauer and colleagues have shown that if  9-month-old infants are given three exposures to 
a 2-step event, about half of the infants demonstrate ordered recall when tested one month 
later (e.g., Bauer et al., 2001; Carver & Bauer, 1999, 2001). Collie and Hayne (1999) 
observed for a number of specific conditions deferred imitation after a 24 hour delay in 
infants of merely 6 months. 
However, as to the age at which remembering takes place, it is obvious that we still 
do not know exactly when children can consciously recollect the past in an (explicit) 
episodic way and when children are able to be autonoetically aware. Even if delayed 
imitation in its most simple form taps nonverbal declarative memory, based on a single 
event (third person view) (Hayne et al., 2000; Nelson, 1995), it is not sure whether it can 
be equated with a memory (knowledge) of that event as a single, past event within time 
and space.  
In this context it is important to note that it is intuitively probable that before 
children are capable of being autonoetically aware of an event, they possess - aside from 
the capacity of semantic memory and associated noetic consciousness - already the 
capacity of encoding personally experienced events related on an implicit 'imaginative' and 
experiential level, as can be seen when children imitate experienced events very soon after 
birth. Schank and Abelson (1977), for instance, claimed that babies of 4 months of age 
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may have "personal scripts". They stressed the memory of episodes or a standardized 
generalized episode which they termed a "script". 
Children who are not yet capable of retrieving personal events on an explicit level, 
we suggest, possess imaginal, "experiential" information on an implicit level expressed as 
anoetic consciousness. These conclusions still need further empirical confirmation as even 
the neural circuits underlying the ability of declarative memory (as the recognition or recall 
of familiar information) are not yet known (Carver et. al., 2000; Hayne et al., 2000). 
 
The Self as Object of Reflection 
Together with a growing capacity for declarative remembering, children establish 
more and more distance towards themselves as an object of reflection. Verbal 
consciousness gains importance for describing one's own person and the environment. 
Outer and inner self-representations in memory form a reality at the age of about six 
(Selman, 1980). In the childhood period between two and twelve, the uniqueness of the 
subjective self becomes more and more relevant so that it is maximally actualized in early 
adolescence (Erickson, 1968). Slowly, children begin to formulate reflective questions 
about themselves and the world. They can now become aware of themselves as defined by 
factual personality characteristics, in a ´knowing´ or ´noetic´ sense, or episodically, in an 
´autonoetic sense´.  
The semantic self is represented with a sum of different traits, whereas the episodic 
self is represented with behavioral memories and autobiographical memory. We can 
describe our semantic self by definitions such as: "I am honest, difficult, intelligent and my 
birthday is the 28th of August, etc.", whereas to describe our episodic self we have to 
include more of our history, such as: "I am a person who had a nice youth, though 
sometimes when my father did not say anything for days, I got easily upset".  
Based upon described developmental findings and conceptual descriptions, a 
continuum of consciousness will be outlined. 
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2. A CONTINUUM OF CONSCIOUSNESS: From Unconsciousness and Unknowing 
Consciousness Towards Knowing Consciousness  
 
2.1. UNCONSCIOUSNESS AS PREREQUISITE FOR CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Unconsciousness refers, on the one hand, 1.to the preferences, related tendencies, 
thoughts, affects and cognitions that are not the object of the present state of awareness. 
The continuum of unconsciousness towards consciousness, involves a graded potentiality 
for an unconscious process to become aware. Freudian repressed memories (Freud, 1923), 
for example, might never come into consciousness, they might eventually be triggered by 
an associated situation or memory, or they may be masked in a transformed form. Mostly 
they work implicitly through (1) our ability to give meaning, (2) corresponding 
experiences and procedural memory and related anoetic and (3) noetic and autonoetic 
consciousness. Implicit processes such as non-declarative memory have a non-conscious 
influence on behavior (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). These processes refer to every 
change in experience, thought and action that is attributable to a past event, such as 
priming effects, savings in relearning, or proactive and retroactive interference (Kihlstrom, 
1993). In prosopagnosia, memories for a specific face are in a way preserved, but the 
patient cannot express it on a conscious level. Unconsciously they react with physiological 
responses to familiar and unfamiliar faces. Also, many people, who do not report verbally 
that they are threatened or stressed, show measurable responses on a physiological level. 
2. The second sort of unconscious processes are those of encoding and storage of 
information and the strengthening of memories. We never become consciously aware of 
these neural processes. These are, in a way, automatic processes, whereas conscious 
awareness is a controlled process (Kihlstrom, 1996). Automatic processes work via 
specific input, independent of any intentionality of the subject, and they cannot be 
controlled or terminated. We have no introspective access to automatic procedures, or to 
their operations. These can only be known by inference (Kihlstrom, 1996). In this process 
of transition between unconsciousness and consciousness, selectivity is included. As 
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Zeman (2001) stated, there is always a foreground and a background determined by the 
limited capacity at a given moment. 
 
2.2. "UNKNOWING CONSCIOUSNESS" 
 
2.2.1. CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Consciousness refers to the level of access that one's awareness can take to some or 
many of the aspects of his or her own objective and subjective existence, the personal 
mental process and their variations (Bisiach, 1988). Consciousness is a mental state that 
permits us to have a phenomenological awareness of our experience (Moscovitsch, 2000). 
It is the capacity to become aware of something, whereby awareness is the manifestation or 
expression of this capacity. Awareness is always about something. Consciousness, also 
anoetic consciousness, is not directed at something specific, in opposition to awareness, 
which implies the attention to that something. Characterized by what Tononi and Edelman 
(1998) described as integration and differentiation; each conscious experience is a unified 
experience achieved in hundreds of milliseconds. The brain has namely the capacity to 
experience numerous different conscious states, within a short period of time. 
Consciousness, based on its capacity to form a memory trace, can be divided in different 
sorts of consciousness: from anoetic to noetic and autonoetic consciousness. The "higher" 
the level of consciousness on the continuum, the more integration of different senses is 
involved, affect, imagination, language and intentional planning. That integration is 
necessary, becomes illustrated by examples of states where it may fail, such as specific 
constellations in split brain patients, or states of dissociation.  
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2.2.2. ANOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Anoetic consciousness is a kind of procedural/affective sensory, and primary level 
consciousness on the continuum of consciousness. It is based on information that one can 
act upon without bringing it into explicit consciousness, which corresponds to the lack of 
awareness of the mental 'contents' of a task (Tulving, 2001).  
As a pre-reflective state, anoetic consciousness does almost not become apparent in 
awareness, it is always present, as long as the person is not asleep or in a state of coma. Tt 
appears in experience as a result of sensory input which makes the difference between 
being awake, being conscious, and asleep. We feel that we are and know intuitively how to 
act upon the world. In parallel, in early childhood, as discussed before, the newborn lives 
almost in a state of sensory affective responsiveness with only limited directed attention 
and little selective capacity with respect to autonomic, sensory and motor functions. At 
first, babies possess a form of primary consciousness without explicit distinction between 
the I and the world. It is the state of small children before they become aware of 
themselves on a declarative level. There is little or no voluntary involvement. Information 
processing happens almost automatically, controlled by auditory and visual input (Baars, 
1997; Posner & Raichle, 1994). As a state of being in the stream of consciousness it gives 
us a feeling of continuity. No reflective object involvement is implied, as opposed to 
higher levels of consciousness. Because it remains rudimentary, or global, and is the least 
complex level of consciousness; it does not involve a 'thinking' subject as is necessary for 
higher levels of consciousness. In very young children, as we mentioned above, and in 
adults, we see preferences for specific faces and situations, although the children do not 
know this on an explicit level (Zajonc, 1980, 2001). 
 
Anoetic Self-Experience? 
At a specific point in development, though this is difficult to determine, the child 
experiences that it exists as an organismic being. The first implicit awareness of oneself in 
interaction with the environment is a global state or a sense of self, or what we 
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temptatively call 'anoetic self-experience'. Anoetic self-experience refers to the primary or 
pre-reflective experience of one's own self, based on being embodied in social and physical 
reality. The anoetic self is not the object of reflective thought and is developed early in the 
intimate dialogue between the mother and her child, probably even prenatally. This shared 
interaction, which postnatally includes the observation of facial expressions of the mother 
or caregiver is an essential prerequisite for developing anoetic self-experience and 
memory. It results from the first procedural representations of the confrontation with the 
world and associated affect.  
This state goes also together with what Zeman (2001) defined as self-detection by 
the organism that can respond to stimuli impinging from outside and eventually change its 
behavior to handle them. Only a global, diffuse and experiential representation or 
awareness of existential experience exists.  
In adulthood, access to one's anoetic self-experience can be compared with one's 
own felt sense (Gendlin, 1962). It gives us the possibility of having an experienced 
meaning of things, a meaning which may be reflected somatically. It is primarily 
preconceptual and can be differentiated into various affective, meaningful aspects 
influencing actual information processing.  
In anoetic self-experience, the self is involved in interpreting something without 
being "self-aware" (Velmans, 1992). Anoetic consciousness constitutes a state of 
continuous implicit experiencing, associated directly with the self of the actual moment, or, 
indirectly, with the me of the past.  
 
Anoetic Consciousness as an Immediate State of Experience  
The direct, immediate realization of the world is enough to become anoetically 
aware. In accordance with Marcel (1983) and Bargh, and coworkers (2001), it is probable, 
that perceptual processes which give rise to a state of consciousness, immediately 
redescribe sensory data into representations accompanied by the automatic activation of 
implicit memory. Anoetic consciousness involves then the implicit complexity of the 
different contents or kinds of events that we continuously experience in the present and 
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have experienced in the past. In this context, it is still an open question whether anoetic 
awareness as phenomenal awareness can be the direct reflection of perceptual awareness 
without the implicit activation of an underlying memory trace or representation.  
Influencing Meaning, Symbolization and Behavior  
Anoetic consciousness influences phenomenal experience and modulates "the tone 
of behavior" (Marcel, 1983). The phenomenal quality of this anoetic consciousness is 
influenced by social constructs, related meanings and the self that enters into the 
information processing producing this experience until an appropriate symbol has been 
found in the mind. Words can be used to refer to this sensorial or physiologically felt sense 
of existence in the world. Putting it in words transport this continuous experience into 
another one constructing and reconstructing the actual experience (cf. Gendlin, 1962).  
The intersubjective dimension of consciousness is the capacity of a person to 
communicate this state, demonstrating a specific relation with oneself (Natsoulas, 1983). 
Language or gestures may become used to express consciousness of something. If put in 
words, explicit symbols or an image of the implicit meaning becomes apparent.  
 
2.3. "KNOWING": NOETIC, AND AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
"The mind knows that it knows" (James, 1890) 
 
Reflective Consciousness 
Inherent in being reflectively conscious is the potentiality for a direct awareness of 
the occurrence of something. Mostly, explicit object-related awareness springs into the 
foreground when the automaticity of being is not enough to handle the world. In the state 
of being awake, attentive processes towards something with a representation of that object 
occur (James, 1890; Baars, 1991; Velmans, 1999). Inherent in being reflectively conscious 
is the direct awareness of a representation at that moment. It is supposed to imply a 
cognitive relationship between the one who is aware and that of which he or she is aware. 
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Information that becomes processed in awareness then is at the focus of attention, selected 
from competing information. Every conscious state, with depending variance, involves 
attentive processing most obviously clear in explicit awareness. Direct reflective 
consciousness based on episodic memory informs us about the qualitative character of 
some of our retroconsciousness. Autonoetic consciousness includes a qualitative reflective 
experience of consciousness in opposition with unconsciousness that can never be 
unconsciously reflective (cf. Natsoulas, 1986).  
 
2.3.1. NOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
The semantic memory system represents symbolically representable knowledge 
which an individual has about the world. Though being by definition a presence-oriented 
memory system, it provides an individual the access to one's own past and the world, 
detached from personally colored experience. The mode of this access is one of 'knowing,' 
not 'remembering'; it is also without what James calls 'warmth and intimacy' (Gardiner, 
1988, 2000; Gardiner & Java, 1993; James, 1890; Andreasen et al., 1995; Tulving & 
Markowitsch, 1998). It gives us a factual understanding of things. Also, thinking about the 
'facts of the world' means being noetically aware of what one is thinking, as well as being 
aware of such awareness (Tulving, 2002).  
 
2.3.2. AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
Autonoetic consciousness is the capacity to mentally represent protracted existence, 
to possess and act with the sense of chronesthesia. As a self-generated, self-knowing state, 
attention in autonoetic consciousness can be directed to 1. the past in retrograde 
consciousness, 2. the present in "real-time" consciousness and 3. to the future in 
'prospective' consciousness. Autonoetic consciousness can be (1) the explicit self-
awareness, and/or (2) the explicit awareness of something or someone else in a specific 
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time-space context. When attention is directed from the present to the past to re-experience 
personal past in subjective time, it makes use of episodic memory (Tulving, 2002).  
 
Episodic Memory  
Episodic memory is a past-oriented context-embedded memory system (Tulving, 
1999, 2002). It makes up the most advanced and hierarchically highest memory system, 
allowing us the development of an integrated identity (Markowitsch, 2003b; Tulving and 
Markowitsch, 1998; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997). Tulving (1985, 1999, 2001) defined 
episodic remembering as "cognitive, symbolic and representable". Episodic remembering 
involves the encoding of specific information of a particular occasion within a context and 
its reactivation and explicit representation on a subsequent occasion. It is the product of 
continuous construction and reconstruction of the individual's feelings, thoughts, goals and 
behavior, mediated by the actual self. The information the person is aware of includes 
information about the source from which prior information was learned as well as the 
temporal reference of an event. We are able to select an event as a reference point and to 
judge whether a recollected event came before or after this point of reference (Robinson, 
1986).  
 
Autonoetic Consciousness and the Awareness of Time and Memory 
Autonoetic consciousness also involves the conscious awareness of subjective time 
('chronesthesia', Tulving, 2002). The sense of subjective time in humans makes possible to 
engage in mental activities and attain goals that are not possible for an organism which 
does not possess this capacity. Autonoetic consciousness, however, is in opposition to 
episodic memory, not limited to the past. The individual can have an awareness of personal 
time, looking backward, in the present, as well as looking forward (Tulving, 2001; 
Wheeler et al., 1997). Autonoetic consciousness departs from the self in subjective time, 
whereas in chronesthesia, awareness of time in itself comes into the fore. 
 
Autonoetic Consciousness and "The Feeling of Warmth and Intimacy" 
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Autonoetic consciousness confers to the phenomenal flavor of the remembering of 
past events (Tulving, 1985, p. 3). The flavor distinguishes remembering from other kinds 
of consciousness such as those characterizing perceiving, thinking, imaging or dreaming.  
James (1890) described 'remembrance' as related with a direct feeling; its object suffused 
with 'warmth and intimacy' which no object of mere conception ever attains to. 
Remembering is guided by a specific feeling of subjectivity specified by the internal and 
external situation in the past. It is embedded in embodied experiences, associated with 
feelings that give meaning to these experiences. These feelings are applied to form self-
knowledge about oneself and other functional relationships as also to maintain a sense of 
well-being (Barclay, 1993). 
 
 3. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BRAIN 
 
3.1. MANY SELVES, MANY STATES OF CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
It is generally accepted now that the neural substrates of consciousness, the self, 
and self-consciousness, are distributed across the brain in toto (Markowitsch, 1999a). No 
single region in the brain is responsible for consciousness all the time. It is the brain that 
creates a functional unit out of the different sorts of consciousness and self-systems. 
Nevertheless, individual regions contribute differently to the creation of a united 
consciousness - starting from the asending retricular formation in the upper medulla and 
brain stem, and ending in the frontal lobes and limbic brain circuits.  
Brain processes are spatiotemporally distributed, whereas from the internal point of 
view of the subject, they form a unified whole (Mitterauer, 1998). The functional 
organization of the brain is composed of multiple representational units of the neural 
network and processes interacting with each other, continuously integrating different 
information (Mesulam, 1990). The interconnection between the units is anatomically 
complex, entailing lateralized, hierarchical, cortical and subcortical integration (Stuss, 
1995). A recurrent network in the brain integrates information from different sensory 
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modalities into convergent modules (Damasio, 1989). The process of being aware, as 
Singer (1998) suggested, stems from meta-representations, which are implemented by the 
dynamic association of distributed neurons into functionally coherent assemblies rather 
than by individual specialized cells. Damasio and Damasio (1994), borrowing from 
Changeux (1983), referred to a 'neuronal self', capable of producing this experience of 
subjectivity or representing units. The brain might have many locations of (self-) 
consciousness. The self and associated consciousness represents a multiple system. These 
different selves are correlated with different states of consciousness, represented by 
parallel, distributed processing areas of neural networks (Rumelhart et al., 1986). As a 
distributed process, it has different levels of neural involvement, involving different brain 
areas (Raichle, 1998). 
 
3.2. CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE BRAIN 
 
Regarding the anatomical side of consciousness, anoetic consciousness, like 
sensorial awakeness or wakefulness, is as we suggest, primarily dependent on the 
ascending reticular activating system in the upper brainstem tegmentum, the locus 
coeruleus, midline and intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus, with extensions into the 
cerebral cortex providing feedback to the brainstem centers that play a role in arousal and 
alertness (Bogen, 1995, Frith et al. 1999, Llinas et al., 1998, Young & Pigott, 1999). The 
midline and intralaminar nuclei of the thalamus integrate (1) input arising from the spinal 
cord, cerebellum, brainstem and basal ganglia with reciprocally related inputs from the 
cerebral cortex and (2) exert control over functionally related areas of the striatum and 
prefrontal cortex (Mair et al., 1998). Lesions of the midline and intralaminar nuclei of the 
thalamus have been shown to reduce the capacity for delayed conditional discrimination 
across multiple sensory modalities (Mair et al., 1998). They also affect learning and 
memory related to the cortical-striatal systems which they innervate.  
On the cortical level evidentially many regions participate. We will highlight here 
only those which have more special roles than merely integrating the sensory aspects of 
information. Among these, the retrosplenial cortex (the most caudal portion of the 
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posterior cingulate cortex) receives input from regions importantly engaged in emotional 
processes (such as perceiving and evaluating emotional stimuli), as well as in 
autobiographical memory processing. Inputs from the amygdala to the entorhinal cortex 
and from the entorhinal to the retrosplenial cortex provide further feedback loops for 
emotion and memory (Andreasen et al., 1995; Tulving et al., 1999; Maguire et al., 2000; 
Markowitsch et al., 2003).  
Anterior cingulate activity accompanies the representation and awareness of almost 
any stimuli (Shulman et al., 1997). In a study of Lane and coworkers (1998), for instance, 
measuring (emotional) awareness, subjects' level of emotional awareness during watching 
of emotional and neutral movies correlated with changes in anterior cingulate blood flow. 
This was interpreted by Posner and Rothbart (1998) as suggesting a possible connection 
between cingulate activity and awareness of the stimulus. 
For the selection of information entering consciousness, the executive capacity of 
the prefrontal lobes is of major importance (Young & Pigott, 1999). The prefrontal lobes 
are regarded as the seat of the highest mental functions (Markowitsch, 1995, 2001; Stuss, 
1991; Stuss et al., 2002). They have a central role in the representations of the self, the 
processes of being aware and in the capacity for self-reflection and attribution, and they 
play a prominent role in the higher levels of awareness, reflected by noetic and autonoetic 
consciousness (Henson et al., 1999; Moscovitsch & Melo, 1997; Tulving, 1993; Wheeler 
et al., 1997). The retrieval of episodic information, for instance, is dependent on a proper 
functioning of the prefrontal cortex (Fink et al., 1996; Fletcher & Henson, 2001; 
Markowitsch, 1995, 2001). The prefrontal lobes give us the possibility of having a feeling 
of oneself in a meaningful way. In parallel, in child development, the formation of 
conscious mental (self-) representations, the temporal regulation of behavior, and affective 
self-regulation require increasing involvement of the prefrontal lobes (Bush et al., 2000; 
MacDonald et al., 2000). Correspondingly, between the ages of two and four years, the 
prefrontal system appears to undergo important developments of associated abilities such 
as reflective capacities, effortful control, delay of gratification, and socially appropriate 
behavior (Posner, 2001). 
Posterior dorsolateral and medial regions of the prefrontal cortex exercise executive 
functions such as maintening and organizing information in meaningful ways (Stuss, 1995; 
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Stuss et al., 2002), possibly particularly in the domain of knowing consciousness. Specific 
other areas of the frontal lobes such as the orbitofrontal cortex are involved in evaluative 
processes such as appraisal of information (Pribram, 1987), the direction of attention 
toward oneself and content-related aspects of consciousness (Goldenberg et al., 1989). The 
orbitofrontal cortex is intimately interconnected with the limbic area and has therefore 
been considered to be the "association cortex" for the subcortical forebrain (Pribram, 
1981). It receives multimodal input from all sensory cortical areas and takes a unique 
position between the neocortical areas and the limbic system. Brain imaging studies 
emphasize the orbitofrontal cortex as a major trigger station for ecphorizing emotional 
autobiographical memory (Markowitsch et al., 2003). Moreover, Teasdale and coworkers 
(1999) described the orbitofrontal cortex as having access to preexisting representations of 
schematic mental models, related to the self and others. 
The medial temporal lobes - with their intimate connection with the hippocampal 
formation, the adjacent lateral cortex, and diencephalic structures - have a role in the 
process of becoming aware of something when this leads to the establishment of a memory 
trace (Moscovitsch, 2000). The role of the medial temporal lobes, including their 
hippocampal and parahippocampal portions, for the formation and transfer of declarative 
information to long term storage has been so well established that it needs not to be 
expanded here. 
Mentioning may be done of the amygdala which participates centrally in evaluating 
(LeDoux, 1996; Hamann, et al., 1999) the emotional tone and the meaning of information. 
Especially studies of Urbach-Wiethe patients, who have a bilateral severe calcification of 
the amygdala, have elucidated the esssential contribution of the amygdala in establishing a 
proper conscious binding of emotions and memory (Markowitsch et al., 1994; Cahill et al., 
1995; Siebert et al., 2003).  
The emergence of the qualitative character of an experience results from these 
capacities for convergence, producing both a subjective experience and the implicit 
consciousness of experiential being. Consciousness, accompanied by the capacity for 
propositional knowledge, as in noetic and autonoetic consciousness, is intimately 
dependent on a proper action of the amygdala, thalamocortical circuits, hippocampal and 
neocortical regions.  
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3.2.1. AUTONOETIC AND NOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND HEMISPHERIC 
LATERALITY  
 
A large amount of evidence exists associating episodic and semantic memory 
processes to different cortical circuits. Starting in 1994 with the formulation of the HERA 
(hemispheric- encoding-retrieval-asymmetry) model by Tulving et al., according to which 
right prefrontal regions are differentially more involved in episodic memory retrieval than 
left regions, and left prefrontal regions more than right ones in encoding episodic and 
semantic and in retrieving semantic information, research on hemispheric asymmetries in 
information processing accumulated (Desgranges et al., 1998; Fletcher et al., 1995; Nyberg 
et al., 1996; Tulving et al., 1994; Shallice et al., 1994). Recent research from various 
groups (Markowitsch, et al., 2003; Lepage et al., 2000; Maguire et al., 2001; Piefke et al., 
2003; Wagner et al., 1998a, b) however, questioned the idea of a strict left versus right 
asymmetry in the retrieval of semantic and autobiographic memory and instead 
emphasized a more differentiated bilateral perspective. 
 
3.2.2. EVIDENCE FROM INDIVIDUALS WITH BRAIN DAMAGE 
 
Lesion data suggested that an integrated prefronto-anterior temporal network is 
necessary for successful memory retrieval, including the indexing and triggering of 
recollection of personal past events. Damage to the anterior temporal lobes results in a 
failure of analysis or on-line maintenance of information concerning the self. 
Malfunctioning of these regions - either due to manifest tissue damage or due to 
psychogenic stress and trauma situations, disturbs self-consciousness and meta-
consciousness. Anosognosia, emotional flattening and indifference may be the result 
(Markowitsch, 1996; Markowitsch et al., 1999, 2000). Self-knowledge becomes then 
reduced to the level of semantic knowing of personality characteristics or traits 
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(Markowitsch, 1999b). Patients seem to lack access to their own episodic self as reference 
to act, accompanied by a disturbed sense of time.  
Memories remain peripheral without the central feeling of self instead, the feeling 
of a "foreign element" may exist in memory, impairing the sense of personal continuity, 
self-consciousness, and identity (Picton & Stuss, 1994). Feelings of warmth and intimacy, 
which often accompany a particular memory and thus individually determine the self-
related quality of consciousness, might be missing (Wheeler et al., 1997). The capacity of 
healthy self-regulation, to plan into the future, to trust in the prospective execution of one's 
own goals is related to the experience of past learning episodes, or autonoetic 
consciousness. As a result, adaquate decision-making becomes disturbed. Behavior then 
becomes determined by irrelevant goals or inappropriate habits (Shallice & Burgess, 
1993). Furthermore, brain damage possibly might lead to impairment in inhibitory control 
and novelty detection, causing distractibility, stimulus-driven behavior, reduced confidence 
in personal decisions and in reality-checking (Knight & Grabowecky, 2000). Persons with 
a malfunctioning prefrontal cortex may no longer be interested in or critical towards 
themselves. They become unsure, without an orientation point of inner reference, are 
bound by environmental stimuli and unable to suppress previous responses.  
Damasio (1995) found, for example, that patients with bilateral ventromedial 
frontal damage show decision-making deficits in the personal and social domain, and do 
not have the normal ability to generate somatic responses to emotional stimuli.  
 
4. UNCONSCIOUSNESS AND CONSCIOUSNESS: TWO STATES ON THE SAME 
CONTINUUM 
 
A continuum of consciousness is elucidated, implying an increasing level of 
voluntary involvement, complexity, sharpness of representation, intensity and object-
relatedness. Within this continuum from unconsciousness to consciousness, a graded 
potentiality for unconscious processes to become conscious is found. 
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4.1. UNCONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Unconsciousness on the one hand, refers to the preferences, related tendencies, 
thoughts, affects, and cognitions that are not the object of the present state of 
consciousness. However they do have the potentiality to become aware. Implicit memory, 
or non-declarative memory, for instance, involves the non-conscious influence of 
experiences on behavior and preferences (Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991).  
 
 4.2. ANOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS  
 
As a stream of sensory and visceral consciousness, anoetic consciousness refers to 
the waking state of the organism in the absence of an explicit knowing of a content. It is a 
kind of procedural, pre-reflective sensory, and primary level consciousness within the 
continuum of consciousness. Anoetic self-experience, as the primary distinction between 
the I and the world, is the experience as a being in self-experience, without explicit 
content.  
 
4.3. NOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
This level of consciousness is associated with semantic memory. When a person is 
noetically aware of something, then he or she knows that specific facts have happened in 
the past, but without having access to subjective experience. Noetic self-consciousness is 
the consciousness of the own person in a semantic way, expressed in the awareness of 
personality traits and factual self-knowledge. 
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4.4. AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS 
 
Autonoetic consciousness refers to the capacity to mentally represent protracted 
existence embedded in specific contexts. As a self-generated, self-reflective (knowing) 
state, attention in autonoetic awareness can be directed to the past, the present and the 
future. Autonoetic consciousness can be (1) the explicit self-awareness, and/or (2) the 
explicit awareness of something or someone else in the dimensions of time and space. 
When attention is directed from the present to the past to re-experience personal past in 
subjective time, it makes use of episodic memory (Tulving, 2002). Autonoetic 
consciousness has an affective quality characterized with 'warmth and intimacy" as 
opposed to noetic consciousness, the "cold" consciousness of a semantic fact.  
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CHAPTER 2 
 
NEUROVULNERABILITY 
 
The Influence of Early Stress on the Brain, the Self and Biographical Memory 
 
"The single most significant distinguishing feature of all nervous tissue - of neurons - is 
that they are designed to change in response to external signals. These molecular changes 
permit the storage of information by neurons and neural systems"  (Perry, et al., 1995, p. 
274).  
 
1. THE ROLE OF THE DEVELOPMENTAL ENVIRONMENT IN SHAPING OUR 
CAPACITIES TO COPE WITH STRESSFUL EXPERIENCES 
 
“The same soul governs the two bodies ... one will, one supreme desire, one fear that the 
mother has, or mental pain, has more power over the child than the mother, since 
frequently the child loses its life thereby”. (Leonardi, unknown source). 
 
Introduction 
The intense interaction of a child with his or her environment is an essential 
prerequisite for healthy development of the brain and the sense of life, and for handling the 
continuous stream of tasks within the world. Environmental influences, in particular 
prenatal and postnatal life experiences with the mother and other caretakers influence the 
neural and neuroendocrine reactivity to the demands and stressors the child meets 
(Anisman, et al., 1998; Cicchetti & Tucker, 1994; Cicchetti & Toth, 2000). In this early 
period, brain tissue is still in a continuous state of growth and differentiation (Cicchetti & 
Tucker, 1994) whereby the maternal environment (e.g., prenatal stress, ambivalence 
toward the child) may lead to long-lasting alterations in brain morphology and functions, 
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thereby making the neural networks vulnerable to further stressful influences. The present 
chapter aims at contributing some new thoughts to this topic and at clarifying the facets 
implicated in the expression neurovulnerability.  
We think that many typical and atypical syndromes, such as psychogenic amnesia, 
chronic fatigue syndrome, unspecified affective disturbances, hypertension, immune-
related disorders, dissociative states, depression, etc. may be caused by stress of 
psychosocial and biochemical origin, in association with a pre-existing vulnerability in the 
brain which develops after massive or recurrent stress situations, especially when these 
occur early in development. As we will discuss later, minor head injury, without 
identifiable structural brain damage, occasionally leads to retrograde amnesia for 
autobiographical memory which is otherwise difficult to account for (De Renzi & 
Lucchelli, 1995; De Renzi et al., 1997; Markowitsch, 2000). We will discuss these forms 
of "psychogenic amnesia" in the context of an acquired neurovulnerability within early 
childhood.  
 
Stress 
 The concept of stress as created by Selye in 1956 signifies a reaction of the 
organism towards heightened demands from the environment. Basic stress reactions are a 
greater release of stress hormones (glucocorticoids), an rise in pulse, respiration and blood 
pressure and a narrowing of the pupils. Stress reactions help to control or eliminate dangers 
to the body or the mind to improve one's level of performance. At the same time, cognitive 
flexibility decreases and consequently the abilities to remember old material and to encode 
new information. This is especially the case when stress reactions follow in rapid sequence 
or when they cannot be controlled readily. Stress is controlled via the hypothalamo-
hypophyseal-adrenal axis which regulates the release of stress hormones.   
The experience of stress is common across human life. In such situations 
individuals enter into a state in which external and internal, biochemical and psychological 
resources become vulnerable; the subject cannot cope appropriately with the situation, or is 
overwhelmed  by 'the demands of the world'. Biochemical and psychological homeostasis 
becomes disturbed.  
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In general terms responses towards stress are twofold: either the organism can cope 
with the incoming stressful input and restore homeostasis, or the organism is unable to do 
so. In situations which are experienced as stressful the organism's self is not strong enough 
to struggle appropriately with known and unknown influences.  When stress becomes 
uncontrollable, it may easily threaten the health and well being of the person. On the one 
hand, stress situations stimulate the central and peripheral noradrenergic system through 
the activation of cortical and subcortical neuronal connections. As a consequence, learning 
processes such as discovering how to cope with stress, may be induced (Rothenberger & 
Hüther, 1997). This process is generally called 'experience-dependent' plasticity 
(Greenough et al., 1992). Uncontrollable stress, however, destabilizes neural pathways that 
have already been established and connection patterns with the consequence that it might 
endanger the actual integrity of a child directly and indirectly later in life such as in 
adulthood. 
 
1.1. THE UNBORN CHILD 
 
Early emotional experiences result in the establishment of enduring neuronal 
templates for the later processing of affective information. Especially during pregnancy, 
the child shares every emotion with the mother. Before birth, the infant needs physical and 
affective comfort, warmth and intimacy to build a form of comfortable situation. Early 
patterns of responsiveness to negative and positive emotions of the mother influence 
attachment related to the growth of the orbitofrontal area, the cortico-limbic system 
(Dawson et al., 1992; Schore, 1994) and general brain development of the unborn child. In 
the child's brain, pleasurable or non-pleasurable experiences change the way the infant 
processes other experiences and obtains knowledge (Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994). Massive 
stress of the mother, such as marital problems, the death of her husband, depression, etc., 
stress the psychological and structural neurological development of the infant (Lou et al., 
1994) by fine or massive disturbances at the cellular and subcellular levels, induced by the 
release of stress hormones. 
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Elevated levels of stress hormones in the maternal plasma easily cross the placenta 
and enter the fetal circulatory and nervous systems. Glucocorticoid hormones influence 
neuronal activity, underlying the stress response system, and have long-term consequences 
for the organization of the stress response system. Several studies found out that even 
prenatal ambivalence toward the unborn child may cause stress and therefore be negative 
for later development. It may interfere with fetal development and result in a higher 
incidence of malformations, directly via psycho-endocrine or autonomous influences, or 
indirectly by the way in which the mother acts in this situation of stress, if, for example, 
she attempts to provoke abortion, neglects proper food intake, smokes excessively, or 
abuses alcohol or drugs (Blomberg, 1980). 
 
1.2. THE NEWBORN CHILD  
 
From mild, stimulating, to deteriorating and destroying stress 
The experience of stress displays many variations, beginning from slight, mild 
stress which might even stimulate neuronal differentiation and development, to stress 
inhibiting developmental processes, and ranging up to massive destructive stress. These 
stress responses can be buffered or enhanced by influences from the direct social 
environment. 
 
1.2.1. BUFFERING THE STRESSRESPONCE 
 
Mutual Secure Interaction, the Formation of Motivational Preferences  
Child development is characterized by a rapidly increasing interaction of the child 
with his or her social and material world. At birth the sensibility for stress is very high; 
even undressing and weighing the newborn elicit significant elevations of cortisol (Gunnar, 
1992). Born with this sensibility, the newborn is highly dependent on the ontological 
security of the immediate environment and is continuously seeking affective support, 
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tenderness and protective care. Very early within this development, it is aware of the 
presence of other human beings - through the sensorial perception of olfactory, gustatory, 
tactile, auditory, and visual experiences.  
Even before the cerebral cortex is active, the fetus already seeks human contact. We 
can easily observe how the basis of motivational processes is already set up very early in 
embryogenic brain tissue. Infants sense the emotional and intersubjective meaning of 
expressive movements, they perceive from their caretakers, in a global Gestalt-like 
manner, without reflective distance. Slowly, in the dynamic exchange with their caretakers, 
children learn to understand the association between the production or the imitation of 
specific expressive behavior and their rewarding or negative effect on the significant other. 
The primary caretaker facilitates, by subtle or massive punishment or reward of the infant, 
the development of corresponding pathways (Meltzoff & Moore, 1992). The 
undifferentiated cells and pathways of the developing cortex and further brain structures 
are engaged in evaluating situations, contributing to the first base for the development of 
the formation of dynamic representations of others (Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994) and the 
world, becoming expressed in emotional preferences and behavioral tendencies of 
approach and avoidance. These mutual body and environmental influences continually 
stimulate cerebral structures.  
 
Secure Attachment and Representation of the Self 
Bowlby (1973) and Ainsworth and coworkers (1978) all strongly emphasized the 
importance of a secure caregiver and interaction-based attachment to the infant. If 
newborns and other young children are intuitively „understood", they consistently learn to 
trust the specific relation between them and their caregivers, their behavior and associated 
effects (Gunnar, 1998). Secure internal representations of relationships and attachment and 
of one's own self, appear to function as a buffer against stress, enabling the child to avoid 
being afraid when separated briefly from their mother. Positive, trustful early experiences 
lead to a permanent adaptation of stress receptors in the brain (Meaney et al., 1985). These 
stress-sensitive receptors are involved in terminating the response (Sapolsky, 1992), 
allowing stress levels to return to a baseline level after confrontation with new stimuli.  
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1.2.2. FACILITING THE STRESSRESPONSE 
 
Lack of Interactional Reciprocity 
The opposite of intuitive parenting - mismatching, unpredictable reactions - 
disorganizes the child and results in an increasingly insecure attachment (Bowlby, 1969). 
Before and after birth, inconsistent or ambivalent social interaction disturbs attachment, the 
experience and expression of warmth and intimacy. Particular aspects of parental behavior, 
such as intrusiveness, help to explain why insecure attachment does not "buffer" the stress 
response by related release of stress hormones (Gunnar, 1998). Mothers who do not intuit 
their children, for instance, persistently engage the infant even when he or she is looking 
away from her and attending to someone or something different (Tronick et al., 1982). 
Spitz (1965) spoke of 'psychotoxic maternal care'.  
To react negatively upon or neglect the expressive attempts of the child (who 
cannot understand why this occurs), confuses and stresses him or her. Mothers with 
postnatal depression, for instance, do not reward positive expressions of their child. In 
several studies on affect production and perception by caregiver and infants, it was found 
that depressed mothers exhibit fewer animated faces and voices (e.g., Field et al., 1988). 
During interaction, there is less sharing of positive emotions, increased matching of 
negative emotional expressions and neglect of the emotional expressions of the child. 
When the mother shows an immobile face or starts looking away from the infant, the child 
first tries to restore contact by targeted gazing, making eye-contact and smiling. After 
trying a while, the child's face is less orientated towards the mother and may fall into a 
slumping position. Infants of depressed mothers manifest a preference for sad faces and 
voices. Speech of depressed mothers differs in content and emotional tone: it is less 
focused on the experiences of the child and if it is associated with the child, the mother is 
more critical and hostile and seems to refer less to the infant as an intentional being 
(Murray et al., 1993; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994).  
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Separation from the Mother 
During development, the child learns to exercise a variety of strategies to make the 
world predictable with respect to coping with the coming and going of the mother; 
separation and being left alone is a minor fear experience in this period of life (Bowlby, 
1973), and extended separation leads to the potentiality of trauma and ingrained 
helplessness, when repeated cries of the infant do not bring the mother back. In this 
context, research of de Kloet, Korte, Rots, and Kruk (1996) on rats has shown that these 
animals indeed develop extreme reactions of distress caused by the separation from their 
mother. It was shown that longer periods (24 h) of separation of the rats' infants disrupt the 
stress-associated hyporesponsive period with a rise in corticosterone. Mother-deprivation 
of rats at the postnatal age of three days results in hypercorticism and increased 
nigrostratial dopamine responsiveness (Rots et al., 1996). In human infants, brain 
organization is apparently stimulated by repeated daily short maternal separations by the 
subsequent maternal care, which should facilitate maturation of specific neural limbic 
pathways (Meaney et al., 1994; Levine, 1994). Important here for an individual's 
development are the "reunion" phases after periods of stress (Ainsworth et al., 1978), 
indicating the quality of attachment, regulation and arousal (Stern, 1983). These reunion 
episodes - especially the anticipation phases - may act, as Stern (1989) suggested, as one of 
the first generators of the autobiographical experience of episodic memory.  
However, if the mother-child interaction becomes uncontrollable and turns into 
irrepressible stress, it inhibits normal development and leads to an enhanced sensitization 
for subsequent stress (Rosenfeld et al., 1994; Levine, 1994).  
 
Emotional Trauma 
Many children witness violence, or are victim of abuse. Such experiences may be 
stressful and even traumatic. As traumatic experiences are learned in an extreme emotional 
context, they may lead to drastic changes in an infants' percept of his or her direct social 
environment and of the world as a whole, resulting in a hostile, stressful image of the 
world (Schore, 1994). A traumatized child is often in a state of low-level fear associated 
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with hyperarousal or dissociation. The whole neural organization becomes mediated by 
such an experience or by prolonged series of experiences. In addition, the abusive 
caregiver often provides little protection against other potential abusers of the infant 
(Schore, 2001).  
Posttraumatic stress disorder is one of the massive and severe expressions of the 
influence of very acute stress on the relation with one's own self.  
 
Inhibition of Emotional Expression 
Stress is a joint product of the individual and his or her environment. Certain 
conditions such as a positive relationship with the significant other have a preventive effect 
by facilitating verbal and nonverbal expression, whereas other conditions are inhibitory 
(Buck et al., 1992). Expressing experienced traumas helps to process and organize 
complex and painful experiences (Bremner, 1995). Pennebaker, Hughes and Oheeron 
(1987) and Pennebaker (1993), for example, found that adults, when asked to refrain from 
talking about traumatic experiences, exhibited higher levels of skin conductance, than 
when asked to describe these experiences verbally. While talking about traumatic 
experiences decreases the level of skin conductance, listening to traumatic experiences of 
others enhances skin conductance levels. As a consequence, some people tend to avoid 
listening to others and in correspondence to their children's problems, and then force the 
others, like their children in a subtle way to be silent about these problems. However, it has 
been shown that children who verbally inhibit their reaction to stress show significantly 
elevated systolic blood pressure, higher heart rates and levels of stress hormones (Fontana, 
Rosenberg, & Marcus, 1987). External inhibition of emotional expression by children 
might be explained as another kind of neglect, impatience, and social avoidance behavior 
(Pennebaker et al., 1987). 
In line with the observation that listening to traumatic experiences may enhance the 
own level of stress, this effect might also be placed in the context where the child has to 
listen to their parents' emotional problems, stressing the child by burdening such 
psychologically painful experiences on them from early life.  
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Consequently, the way in which children and adults handle stressful emotional 
issues in their lives affects the development of their cognitive-affective brain functioning, 
their health and their immuno-responsiveness: neurovulnerability may be the consequence. 
 
2. NEUROVULNERABILITY 
 
Neurovulnerability leads to, and is caused by biochemical changes, in particular the 
release of stress hormones, resulting in fine or massive disturbances at the cellular and 
subcellular levels. This process is accompanied by structural and metabolic alterations in 
specific areas of the brain (Bremner, 2002; Sapolsky, 1994) The whole neural organization 
becomes mediated by the above described early experiences or prolonged series of 
experiences in childhood, going together with an accelerated loss of glia and nervous 
tissue, either cells as a whole or portions of them, such as presynaptic vesicles, axonal and 
dendritic arborizations, or synapses. As a result, cortical thickness may shrink, and seizure-
like activity may develop, particularly in emotion and memory sensitive area.  
Neurovulnerability is associated with reduced neuroplasticity, which later facilitates 
the development of psychopathological conditions and functional disturbances which are 
difficult to explain with standard medical and psychological frameworks. We postulate that 
many mental health problems share the same pathophysiological mechanism, a syndrome 
of subjective discomfort developed as the result of an early acquired enhanced sensitivity 
or reactivity of the central nervous system at psychological, biochemical, 
neurophysiological, and molecular levels (cf. Miller, 1997). The underlying explaining 
alterations can remain undetectable or without obvious effect on behavior for a prolonged 
time, but may lead to disturbances in neuronal functioning long-term.  
As both a precedence and a consequence of neurovulnerability, we postulate 
biochemical, behavioral and psychological consequences of the negative influences we 
described in the first part of the text, including an increased reactivity to stress, an 
enhanced release of stress hormones, atrophy of specific brain regions and a heightened 
vulnerability of the self. Chronic or massive stress inhibits emotional learning and 
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memory, and therefore the development of the self as a memory-dependent entity. It 
furthermore inhibits a situation-specific activation of the self, which is necessary in order 
to find optimal, need-based self-regulation. 
 
2.1. INCREASED AFFECTIVE AND BEHAVIORAL STRESS RESPONSE 
 
2.1.1. CONSEQUENCES OF PRENATAL STRESS 
 
Our stress response system, shaped by genetic factors and life experiences, is most 
severely influenced by neonatal life events (de Kloet et al. 1996). Fetal brain development 
is changed and retarded by high levels of maternal stress hormones (Glynn, Wadhwa, & 
Sandman, 2000). In pups of rats, unpredictable gestational stress increases fearful stress 
responses, which may become overt in adulthood as behavioral problems to stressful and 
conflict-rich situations (Fride & Weinstock, 1988). If there is a long term enhancement in 
the level of stress, a variety of changes all over the central nervous system may be induced, 
altering physiological functions and behavior throughout the development of the organism. 
Studies in rats have shown that, after prolonged stress before birth, the offspring is more 
easily frightened, exhibits less exploratory behavior, demonstrates generally heightened 
tendencies of behavioral inhibition (Fride & Weinstock, 1988) and show reduced tendency 
for social interaction (Takahashi & Haglin, 1992). Fride and Weinstock (1988) for 
instance, administered synthetic stress hormones (dexamethasone) to pups of a few days in 
age. In pre-term maturation, they observed an acceleration of incisor eruption, eye opening 
and development of motor skills, and a retardation of body and brain growth. In support of 
our neurovulnerability hypothesis, they observed hyperactivity of these animals in 
adulthood with stereotypy and decreased adaptability and learning capacity in new 
situations. Averse stimuli especially cause enhanced emotional reactivity and transient, 
long-lasting or irreversible changes in neural function (Hayes & Dixon 1994; Hayes et al, 
1992; Miller, 1997).  
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2.1.2. CONSEQUENCES OF POSTNATAL STRESS  
 
Disturbed or impaired development of the brain as a consequence of major stress, 
caused by inappropriate interaction (e.g., deprivation) between caregiver and child, may 
later result in improper coping in various situations. Vice versa, especially during 
adolescence, empathy, attachment and the regulation of emotions depend to a large degree 
on proper regulation by structures of the limbic system. 
A disturbed mother-infant attachment in childhood enhances the likeliness for the 
development of depressive pathology in the child (Cytryn et al., 1980). Zuckerman, Als, 
Bauchner, Parker, and Cabral (1990) found, for example, that newborn children of 
depressed mothers were less consolable and more disoriented than children of non-
depressed mothers. Field and co-workers (Field, 1998a, b; Field et al., 1988) found that 
infants of depressed mothers vocalized less, displayed increased gaze, aversion and 
fussiness, and at the same time, had higher heart rates and decreased vagal tone. These 
children appeared outwardly calm, but were subjectively distressed in real. In the same 
way as depressed adults, they exhibited a dissociation between behavioral and 
physiological responses. On the one hand, there is the experience of stress accompanied by 
enhanced levels of stress hormones, and on the other hand, after the first response of stress 
the child learns to "behave" depressively as a result of imitating the mother's depressed 
behavior (Dawson, 1994). Neglected or maltreated children show globally enhanced levels 
of cortisol (Hertsgaard et al., 1995). If the mother is emotionally absent, the child cannot 
develop a common level of understanding with her (Murray et. al., 1993). Infants show 
insecure, resistant attachments as a reaction to a mother who is, in other words, 'physically, 
but not emotionally present'. Lack of reciprocity disengages attachment with the mother 
while the infant's confidence in his or her own effectiveness within the environment creates 
a conviction of helplessness. The infants of these mothers show helpless and dysregulated 
behavior and even delays in growth and development at twelve months of age (Field, 
1998a).  
In a traumatic environment, there is also the phenomenon that as a traumatized 
child encounters trauma-related information, the critical neural pathways related to the 
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experience of the threat, will become reactivated, increasing thereby the probability for a 
disconnection of the self, as we will discuss farther below. 
In later development, children exposed to traumatic situations (e.g., witnessing 
violence, having been abused or kidnapped) may manifest a wide range of posttraumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD) symptoms, behavioral disorders, phobias, anxieties and depressive 
disorders. The experience of cumulative traumatic stress results in the expression of 
different symptoms (Yehuda et al., 1997). Maltreated and abused children, for instance 
tend to become depressed and hyperactive ones and show conduct disorders (Cicchetti & 
Toth, 2000). Sexual abuse for example has a deep impact on personality development, 
inducing feelings of shame, anger, stigmatization, low self-esteem, social isolation, poor 
impulse control, and self-destructive behavior (Brown et al., 2000; Conaway & Hansen, 
1989; Kendall-Tack et et al., 1993; Toro, 1982). As we can notice, in response to these 
chronic or massive stress situations, children and later adults typically display significant 
reductions in learning, perceptual, intellectual and memory capacities (Cicchetti et al., 
1993).  
These deprivation- or trauma-induced abnormalities affect the limbic system to an 
extent that the individual may become emotionally and socially "blind" and unable to 
perceive, process, or respond in a normal fashion to social and emotional stimulation 
(Cicchetti, 1989; Cicchetti & Rizley, 1981; Joseph, 1999).  
 
Increased Stress Response  
Stress during critical periods of development alters the brain's biochemistry. Two 
stress systems, the sympathetic adrenal-medullary system, and the neuroendocrine system, 
the hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical system (HPA-axis) in the brain and periphery 
become activated (Davis et al., 1997; de Kloet et al., 1996; Henry & Stephens, 1977). They 
are described as the effort and distress systems, or the fight-flight and conservation-
withdrawal systems. The sympathetic adrenal medullary system (SAM) is most strongly 
engaged in connection with strong emotional states, fear and anger, as in traumatic anxiety. 
After prolonged and repeated separations from a contact-aversive, non-attuning mother, 
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the hyperaroused child is in a state of sympathethic-dominant agitated stress (Schore, 
1994).  
Hyperarousal of the traumatized child is characterized by an enhanced sympathetic 
nervous system and hypothalamic-pituitary adreno-corticothrophic activity, increased 
activation of the centrally controlled peripheral autonomic nervous system, which results 
in accelerated heart rate, blood pressure, respiration, the release of stored sugar, enhanced 
muscle tone and general hyper-vigilance for critical information (Perry et al., 1990). The 
HPA-axis is thought to function in connection with overwhelming threats (Henry & 
Stephens 1977). The hypothalamus in the brain releases corticotropin releasing hormone 
which stimulates the pituitary gland, immediately outside the brain barrier to release 
adrenocorticotrophine hormone (ACTH) which stimulates the adrenal gland in the 
periphery to release adrenal glucocorticoids. It is well documented that adreno-cortical 
hormones are involved in mediating the influence of stress on cognitive performances 
(McEwen, 1997; de Kloet et al., 1999; Roozendaal, 2000; Roozendaal et al., 2001). 
Enhanced or chronic levels of glucocorticoids result namely in cell elimination and 
neuronal death (Guilarte, 1998). Glucocorticoids mobilize energy by inhibiting the uptake 
and storage of energy substrates (Sapolsky, 1993, 1996, 2000). When the stressor is 
terminated, glucocorticoids are able to inhibit subsequent adreno-corticotrophine release 
from the adrenal cortex as a negative feedback loop (Meaney et al., 1994).  
 
Inverted U 
The effects of different intensities of stress are reflected by an inverted U: brief 
periods of stress can potentate memory formation, whereas more chronic or longer periods 
of stronger stress may disturb memory processes to the extent of a total blockade ("mnestic 
block syndrome"; Markowitsch et al., 1999b; Markowitsch et al., 1999c). On the neuronal 
level, a moderate duration of stress causes reversible atrophy of apical dendrites on 
pyramidal neurons, while basal dendrites remain unchanged. Chronic stress, as mentioned 
before, generally is potentially more dangerous than acute stress (Garmezy & Masten, 
1994). Prolonged high concentrations of glucocorticoids may lead to hypertension, 
hyperglycemia, suppression of the immune system and brain cell death (Rosenfeld et al., 
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1993; Sapolsky, 1993; 1996; 2000). In chronically stressed rats, Magarinos and coworkers 
(Magarinos et al., 1997; Magarinos et al., 1997; McEwen, 1999) observed an altered 
vesicle distribution pattern with depletion of vesicles. The chronic influence of 
glucocorticoids on the hippocampus leads to damage, in the form of the loss of pyramidal 
neurons and decreased dendritic branching. Massive production of glucocorticoids changes 
and reorganizes synaptic connectivity in the hippocampus, leading to severe consequences 
in memory. 
 
Hippocampal Atrophy and Memory Impairment 
The hippocampal formation is a brain area specifically relevant for episodic, 
declarative and spatial learning and memory (Tulving & Markowitsch, 1997; Vargha-
Khadem et al., 1997) and for the processing of stress (Bremner et al., 2000; Bremner et al., 
1997; Bremner et al., 1999; Bremner et al., 2000). The hippocampus has the highest levels 
of two types of receptors for stress hormones, the mineralocorticoid and glucocorticoid 
receptors. Therefore, the highest accumulation of stress hormones occurs in the 
hippocampus and can cause atrophic processes (Porter & Landfield, 1998). 
Glucocorticoids especially impair episodic and declarative forms of memory (as defined in 
Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998), whereas they have no effect on procedural and priming 
forms of memory (McEwen & Sapolsky, 1995).  
Stress experienced before birth, and then extending across the postnatal period, 
influences the maturation and volume of the hippocampus. The hippocampus is one of the 
few brain areas that continues to develop after birth and may even show neurogenesis (Van 
Praag, et aL., 2002). Maternal stress, for example, decreases the number of corticosterone 
receptors in the hippocampus, reducing the inhibition of the release of adreno-
corticotrophic hormones mediated by the corticoid receptors. These adreno-corticotropines 
stimulate the release of adrenal glucocorticoids, possibly leading to neuronal cell death, as 
just mentioned. 
Blockade or deficiency of mineralocorticoid receptors influence the capacity of 
selective attention and integration of sensory stimuli, whereas the impairment or blockade 
of glucocorticoid receptors affects the process of consolidation and retrieval of 
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information. A particularly relevant study of Lemaire and coworkers (Lemaire et al., 2000) 
in rats showed that prenatal stress induces a reduction of hippocampal cell proliferation by 
approximately 45% in all age groups tested. The rats showed also delayed learning in a 
spatial memory task. In this context, Bremner. (1997, 1999, 2000; Bremner & Vermetten, 
2001) found, for example, strong correlations between hippocampal volume and years of 
abuse or maltreatment. These studies show that stress causes a greater reduction in cell 
proliferation from adolescence to senescence with early stress exposure accelerating a 
reduction in hippocampal plasticity. 
 
The Amygdala and the Cingulate Gyrus  
Aside from the hippocampal region, other structures of the limbic system, 
particularly the amygdala and the cingulate gyrus, play an important role in the response to 
stress and appear to be especially sensitive to the destructive influences of stress hormones. 
The amygdala, deep inside the antero-inferior region of the temporal lobe, connects 
with the hippocampus, the septal nuclei, the prefrontal area and the medial dorsal nucleus 
of the thalamus. These connections make it possible for the amygdala to play its important 
role on the mediation and control of stress and major affective processes. According to 
McGaugh, Cahill, Ferry, & Roozendaal, (2000), the amygdala is of essence in the 
mediation of effects of reward and punishment. As limbic area it is central in emotionally 
arousing processes of learning and explicit memory (Cahill et al., 2001; Markowitsch, 
1998/99; Markowitsch et al., 1998; Siebert, et al., in press). Hereby, it should be the level 
of arousal and not the aversive nature that determines the involvement of the amygdala in 
long-term memory enhancement (Cahill & McGaugh, 1990).  
In confrontation with dangerous information, the amygdala becomes triggered, 
giving rise to fear and anxiety which lead the organism into a stage of alertness, getting 
ready to flight or fight in function of self preservation. Stimulation of the amygdala by 
stress enhances the release of corticotropin-releasing factors and activates the 
hypothalamic-pituitary-adrenocortical system (Gabrieli et al., 1995). The receptors for the 
corticotrophin-releasing factor in the amygdala respond to stress by increasing 
corticosterone and adreno-corticoidtrophine hormone (ACTH) release. The basolateral 
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nucleus of the amygdala especially appears to be a key nucleus in regulating hormonal 
effects on memory (Cahill et al., 2001; McGaugh et al., 2000; Roozendaal et al., 1998; 
Roozendaal et al., 2001).  
The cingulate cortex, too, has an important number of cortisol receptors. Together 
with parts of the prefrontal cortex it mediates executive functions (Carter et al., 1998), such 
as effortful behavior, high-caliber attention, control of inhibitory acts (Fletcher et al., 1996; 
Markowitsch et al., 2003; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003), and probably emotions in general. 
The posterior cingulate cortex is more involved in evaluative functions. The role of the 
anterior cingulate cortex role is multiple, and engagements are related to hypothesis 
testing, response selection, emotion processing, anticipation, arousal, visual imagery and 
re-experiencing (Cabeza & Nyberg, 1997; Fletcher et al., 1996; Markowitsch et al., 2000). 
In a study with preschool-aged children with high levels of cortisol Gunnar, Tout, 
de Haan, Pierce, and Stansbury (1997) found, for example that glucocorticoids affect self-
control and self-regulation that required strenuous effort, probably related to the influence 
of the stress hormones on the cingulate cortex. 
 
Enhanced Affective Laterality 
Hemispheric lateralization constitutes one of the most effective evolutionary 
advantages of the human brain: The right hemisphere has a global superiority for 
processing negative emotions, while the left hemisphere is mainly engaged in processing 
positive emotions (Borod et al., 1986; Davidson, 1992, 2000, 2002; Davidson & Irwin, 
1999). The right hemisphere is also more directly involved in controlling the whole body, 
whereas the left one is central in the regulation of action (Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994). 
Functions such as emotional social self-regulation, for example the comprehension of 
prosody, appear to require an enhanced activation of the right side of the brain (Tucker, 
1981). The right hemisphere is also preferentially active under stress conditions (Tucker, 
1981; Bremner, 2002; Driessen et al., in subm.). For instance, posttraumatic stress disorder 
may be paralleled by right hemispheric dysfunction. 
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As we suggested above, the early neonatal and postnatal experience of emotions 
and stress affects hemispheric lateralization which in turn influences the manner of 
information processing. Measurements of resting frontal EEG activity have been found to 
predict the child's response to stress (Davidson & Fox, 1989). In a study by Davidson and 
Fox (1989), 10-month-old infants who demonstrated relative right anterior right prefrontal 
activation during a baseline period were more likely to cry when later separated from their 
mothers. Infants who showed relatively higher left anterior prefrontal activation during the 
baseline period were more likely not to cry in response to maternal separation. Fride and 
Weinstock (1989) also investigated the effects of maternal noise and light stress, applied 
during pregnancy, on the development of behavioral and neurochemical asymmetries in rat 
offspring, observing that stress effects extend into adulthood. The authors argued that their 
findings are consistent with the possibility that cerebral asymmetries induced by prenatal 
stress may offer an explanation for why the offspring show more difficulties in coping with 
anxiety provoking situations. The resting levels of laterality reflected differences in 
reactions towards negative emotion in stressful situations (Davidson & Fox, 1988).  
Enhanced laterality can temporarily "switch" according to the tasks and functions 
the human being has to deal with. Children of mothers who were depressed during 
pregnancy tend to exhibit a characteristic pattern of enhanced right frontal EEG activity 
even until the age of three years (Field, 1998a, b). We assume that in accordance with 
these findings, enhanced right hemispheric laterality may be associated later with enhanced 
vulnerability for negative emotional stress associated with reactive inhibition systems. In 
correspondence with our neurovulnerability thesis, we hypothesize that later in 
development children with enhanced right hemispheric laterality may prove to be more 
insecure and oversensitive to social stress. Several studies found that avoidance behavior in 
children results from the negative emotional experience that they have been exposed to by 
hostile or over-stimulating reactions of the primary caregiver.  
Traumatized individuals are unable to respond to stress in similar ways as normals, 
possibly due to an immature right brain development (Wittling, 1997). In adulthood, there 
may be an enhanced avoidance pattern in habitual coping strategies which facilitates 
dissociation and psychogenic memory problems. Vice versa: prenatal stress in adults might 
lead to a blunting of the stress response in the right and not in the left prefrontal cortex 
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(Brake et al., 2000). On the other hand, children with strong left hemispheric activation 
might be more actively engaged in the world, resulting from a tendency towards an 
autonomic experience of the self. By observing these phenomena, we may conclude again 
that an infant's affect may be predictors for later laterality, approach, impulsiveness and 
level of activity.  
 
Vulnerability on the Level of the Self 
 
The Self 
We define the self as the base of identity and as self-confidence in this identity. The 
self is a conglomerate of need-related experiences and preference-related experiences, 
subsumed to the self, or in other words, summarized as the self. It helps us to direct our 
actions according to our emotional preferences and biological needs.  
 
Impairment of integrated self-development  
The development of the self is essentially associated with the trust within oneself 
and the environment. In early development, disturbed development of the self may be the 
result of a lack of understanding the trials and errors of the child's expressions to 
communicate its needs and preferences to the important other. Severe stress reduces the 
capacity of the self to connect via learning experiences with the environment. As a 
consequence of the influence of stress on various brain regions - such as the hippocampus 
and amygdala, involved in memory - chronic or massive stress inhibits learning, the 
development of representations of positive and negative experiences directly associated 
with the fulfillment of one's own basic needs, or self representations. Stress might inhibit 
the capacity to encode new, context-rich information on a deep emotional level activation 
of the self as a memory structure, and thus 2). the capacity to become involved with the 
self. Enhanced levels of stress hormones at a specific level, especially in the limbic area, 
inhibit the individual from developing this self by episodic learning experiences through a 
reduced capacity to encode or retrieve information. We suggest that exaggerated activity of 
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the stress system, and the associated experience of negative emotion or stress, inhibit 
processing or retrieval of especially complex contextual episodic information in the right 
frontal brain. In correspondence, the right hemisphere appear to be relatively (see Keenan, 
Wheeler, Gallup, & Pascual-Leone, 2000; Markowitsch et al., 2003) more involved in self-
referential cognition, the encoding and retrieval of autobiographical episodic memories, 
whereas the left hemisphere appear to be more involved in semantic memory processing 
(Fink et al., 1996; Markowitsch, 1998, 2000). The right hemisphere is also preferentially 
engaged under stress conditions (Tucker, 1981; Driessen et al., in subm.).  
After learning, it may inhibit the activation of implicit preference-related self-
representations accumulated by the self in accordance with the specificity of the actual 
situation. Later in life, when the self cannot become involved, or expressed in stress 
situations, then the encoding or retrieval of self-related material, especially episodic 
autobiographical information, becomes reduced. This may lead to conditions which 
resemble those of depression, helplessness, emotional flatness, indifference and cognitive 
impairment such as memory disturbance. In this context, it has been found that maltreated 
children perform more poorly on self-related emotion-recognition tasks than do non-
maltreated children (Camras et al., 1983; Camras et al., 1988).  
In such children, the self apparently can no longer work as the basis for need-
related evaluation or as an 'inner point of reference'. This may give rise to reduced self-
confidence too. Self-confidence highly influences the manner of handling stressful 
situations. Children with a low self-concept or those having been exposed to extreme 
stress, such as the experience of abuse, become easily estranged from the self. Flattening of 
affect occurs, and on the other hand, a state of over-vigilance is very common. Persons 
with posttraumatic stress disorders are very alert and hypervigilant to cues which remind 
them of the threatening situation. Traumatized children and adults are also likely to remain 
at a distance from the self, and to become partly disconnected from their own personal 
history especially by psychogenic episodic memory disturbances, depersonalization and 
derealization (Classen et al., 1998).  
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2.2. PSYCHOGENIC AMNESIA AS PROTOTYPICAL EXAMPLE OF 
NEUROVULNERABILITY 
 
Psychological stress or minor brain injury may progress from minor to severe 
episodic autobiographical amnesia due to changes in brain metabolism such as increased 
release of stress hormones or the blocking of receptor channels in memory sensitive areas 
(Markowitsch, 1996, 1998, 2002; Markowitsch et al., 1999b; Markowitsch et al., 1999c, 
2000). Even a single traumatic psychological shock or short-lasting, but massive stress can 
cause transient or even long-lasting "mnestic block syndromes" (Markowitsch, 2002). 
Markowitsch and coworkers (1997, 1999b, c) theorize that 'bottleneck structures' 
especially of the medial temporal lobe may become blocked due to stress-related 
biochemical alterations.  
There is evidence that amnesias without a measurable morphological correlate (as 
inferred from the results of static brain imaging) do show functional neuroimaging 
correlates, and that these conditions can be explained by the early acquisition of 
neurovulnerability in memory-sensitive areas such as the hippocampal formation 
(Markowitsch, 1999a, b; Markowitsch, Kessler et al., 1998; Markowitsch et al., 2000). 
Individuals with a comparatively small hippocampal volume, caused by early stress, for 
example, are more vulnerable to develop functional disorders such as psychogenic amnesia 
due to their reduced capacity to handle stress. Furthermore, as described above, the 
development of the self depends on memory sensitive areas in the medial temporal and 
prefrontal regions (see also Keenan et al., 2000; B. Levine, 2000; B. Levine et al., 1998; B. 
Levine et al., 1999). In association with the estrangement of the self, we see that episodic 
amnesia - whether of direct organic or psychogenic origin - is characterized by an inability 
for re-experiencing episodic events as belonging to one's self (Markowitsch, 1999a; 
Markowitsch & Ewald, 1997; Markowitsch et al., 1993). Inhibited access to one's own 
self-representations is most likely a major cause for an impaired regulation of the self. 
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Case Examples With Psychogenic Amnesia 
In correspondence with the neurovulnerability hypothesis, a few case studies may 
serve to understand the phenomenon of neurovulnerability in association with psychogenic 
or transient amnesia.   
 
Case NN 
Markowitsch, Fink, Thöne, Kessler, and Heiss (1997) described a patient, named 
NN, who showed permanent retrograde amnesia after a fugue condition. This condition 
commenced one morning when he was on his way to get some rolls from the near-by 
bakery. Instead of taking his bicycle to the bakery, he continued riding it for several days, 
without knowing who he was, or what the reason for his trip was.  
After several days he entered a psychiatric clinic where he was diagnosed as having 
a fugue condition. NN did not show any brain abnormalities when investigated by static 
magnetic resonance imaging. Exposing him to his personal past while he was undergoing a 
positron emission tomograph revealed, however, that his brain did not process biographical 
episodes in the same manner as the brains of normal individuals do (Fink et al., 1996), but 
with a higher activation in the opposite, left hemisphere. (The left frontal hemisphere is 
usually engaged in processing neutral, semantic knowledge; De Renzi et al., 1987; 
Markowitsch, et al., 1999a.) We can hypothesize that this left hemispheric processing is 
caused by right hemispheric dysfunction, as described above. The basis for his behavior 
can be found in his childhood. After his birth, his mother did not accept, and in fact 
blatantly neglected, the fact that he was a boy. Later, he was told that he would ruin their 
firm, that he would be unable to lead a successful life and that he was worthless and unfit 
for a normal life. As an adult, he married a women with a similar temperament as his 
mother, putting considerable pressure on him by blaming him continuously that he did not 
make enough money, etc. An enhanced neurovulnerability and associated psychic 
vulnerability in combination with this renewed psychological stress condition can be seen 
as basic for the development of his psychogenic fugue condition. (In fact, he had had a few 
similar, though less severe episodes earlier in his life.) It can be concluded that his 
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autobiographical information processing ability became totally disconnected from the self 
based especially on the right hemisphere as inner point of reference and thus he lost every 
contact to reality.  
 
Case AMN 
Another patient with a related background and a similar psychic condition was 
described by Markowitsch and coworkers (1998, 2000). Case AMN presented with 
psychogenic amnesia and a state of major brain hypometabolism, especially in regions 
sensitive to memory processing. He had experienced an early trauma as a four-year-old 
child, whereby he had seen how a man burnt to death in a car, and later at the age of 23 he 
survived a life-threatening fire at home. This fire in the cellar of his house in fact had been 
minor, but for him at was immediately life-threatening and resulted in an enduring mnestic 
block syndrome (Markowitsch, 1998; Markowitsch et al., 1998). He could not retrieve any 
autobiographical memories for the last six years, and was incapable of acquiring any new 
information. Positron emission-tomography (PET) showed a reduced glucose level in 
memory-sensitive areas of the temporal and diencephalic regions. He could not continue in 
his former position during the first year after the trauma; however, he did succeed in 
regaining memories after a long period of pharmacological and psychotherapeutic 
treatment that took more than 12 months.  
In conformity with the neurovulnerability hypothesis, it can be inferred that the 
singular event of being exposed to a massive traumatic situation as a small child changed 
the hormonal and neurotransmitter sensitivity in his brain, leading to the release of a 
glucocorticoid cascade (O'Brien, 1997) when he was re-confronted with a precarious fire 
situation (Aldenhoff, 1997). 
In evaluating these cases, we have to remark that every person responds 
differentially, and that every category of information processing, including memory 
consolidation, is a process of active construction work. The experience of stress is 
determined by the capacity of the organism to process stress-related stimuli but it is 
essentially influenced by appraisal and sensitization of the self for specific information 
(Bremner, 1995, 1999). Information processing and memory are active processes in which 
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information is selected and filtered, but, significantly, at different levels of awareness we 
only attend to certain, discrete forms of information and not to others. The emotional state 
highly influences the specificity of the information that is selected for processing. The 
preceding functional state determines the following conscious state, and thereby the state 
of information processing as well.  
Taken together, the phenomenon of neurovulnerability develops after repeated, 
early, chronic, or acute confrontation with stressful information, but especially when this 
confrontation occurs during the early critical phases in development. The concept refers 
directly to alterations at the neuronal level, after massive and/or repeated and/or prolonged 
stress. Neurovulnerability facilitates extreme responsiveness following stress-related 
stimuli.  
A heightened behavioral response occurs as a more sensitive neural response is 
evoked by less intense stimuli, as is the case in traumatized children (Perry et al., 1995). In 
traumatized persons, even slight stressors easily sensitize responses such as hyperarousal, 
dissociation, or even psychogenic amnesia, possibly as a defense against the pain and 
helplessness engendered by the traumatic experience. There is an overactivation of the 
relevant neural networks. The nervous system becomes globally vulnerable with respect to 
its stress-processing capacity, and reacts in a hypersensitive way by the meaning 
predicated onto specific information.  
 
2.3. PREVENTION 
 
Buffering Stress 
 
Prenatal 
Future research will provide us with new methods and procedures for 
understanding the vulnerability of the brain, brain plasticity, psychopathology and 
prevention of damage conditions. Our awareness of the fetal sensory and emotional 
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experiences has increased during the last decades, as has the interest in possibilities for 
stimulating the unborn fetus properly. In correspondence with the evidence described 
above for the neural and affective consequences of stress on the child, the environment 
should be actively involved in giving a mother the feeling of wellbeing and relaxation both 
during her pregnancy and after the birth of her child. In addition, techniques such as 
relaxation, techniques for the relief of fear and anxiety, can be recommended to modify 
stress hormone levels (Panthuraamphorn et al., 1998; Sudsuang et al., 1991).  
 
Postnatal  
For the newborn fetus, postnatal stimulation seems to have strong and long-lasting 
physiological consequences. Gentle stimulation of prenatal (multi-)sensory processes, for 
instance, should facilitate mother-child bonding (Meaney et al., 1994). It should facilitate 
the maturation of the brain, for example, which should find expression in an increase in the 
thickness of cortical tissue. It has been found that stimulated infants show a significantly 
larger head circumference which is traditionally seen as an outcome measure of brain 
growth. In addition, synaptic density should be higher and levels of vascularization more 
refined. Social interaction processes as well as motor development should be furthered by 
pre- and postnatal stimulation (Van de Carr & Lehrer, 1986). Touch and audition appear to 
be the principle senses through which mothers change neonatal state and brain activity 
(Field, 1981; Trevarthen & Aitken, 1994). 
In rat pups, we observe that postnatal handling apparently protects the organism 
against age-related cognitive decline (Anisman et al., 1998). As we shortly mentioned 
before, maternal separation from the pups during the first 14-21 postnatal days may have 
positive effects on them when occurring for but short durations (about 15 min) but not for 
longer ones (3 h and more) (Meaney et al., 1991, 1996). Generally, removing rat pups from 
the nest and placing them in an empty cage for a brief period of time leads to fewer anxiety 
responses in adulthood. Postnatal handling may decrease neuroendocrine responses, age-
related processes of cognitive degeneration and may alter central neurotransmitter activity 
caused by stressful influences. In addition, recovery in basal levels of glucocorticoids 
should occur more quickly (Meaney et al., 1991). The expected alteration would most 
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probably also express itself in the reduction of hippocampal corticoid receptors and in an 
emotional reactivity in the behavioral expression of emotions in response of threatening 
situations. Several authors have described that some of the prenatal stress effects are 
reversible by early postnatal experimental handling. But, when mother-child separation 
becomes stressful and to what degree separation as natural postnatal handling can be 
generalized to human beings still has to be investigated. 
 
Interactive Repair and Intuitive Parenting 
Stress in the caregiver affects biological rhythm which is central for the bonding 
process. Important here is the process which Tronick (1989) named "interactive repair", 
which can take place after the child has been stressed. This process of short-term 
regulation of affect has long-term structural influences. Field, Schanberg, and Scafidi 
(1986) suggested that, for instance, massaging the infant is effective in reducing acute 
stress responses. Also, in order to function as a stress regulator for the infant, the primary 
caregiver must be able to regulate his or her own affect with some efficiency (Schore, 
1994). The relaxation of the child through active means on the part of the parents certainly 
improves on the ability of the child for future attempts at self-relaxation to handle 
incoming stress. In this chain of relaxation-inducing strategies, the creation of a sense of 
sameness is vital for inducing the belief in predictability as well as basic trust which forms 
the basis of later stable identity and patterns of attachment. An intuitive, caring, and 
predictable environment should be the primary buffer against neurovulnerability. Only 
within a secure parent-child interaction can the neural basis be established for later 
potential resistance and protection against stress. If one of the parents is depressed, and is 
not able to show proper or adequate emotional readiness in favor of the child, the most 
natural buffers are the non-depressed partners and caregivers, as they provide an optimal 
stimulation and arousal modulation (Field, 1998b).  
 Whether parents convincingly express their readiness for an attachment to their 
children becomes obvious in their manifold expressions of acceptance, in their use of the 
voice, and in a broad spectrum of nonverbal behaviors (Schwartz, 1997). As we already 
stressed, various critical periods are most vulnerable, during which sensitivity and 
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plasticity are highest. These are the prenatal period and the first years of the child's 
development. Imitative and contingent caring responsiveness, focused on the child, 
supports the infant's sense of efficacy and autonomy and therefore stimulates neural and 
thus cognitive and emotional development.  
 
Psychotherapeutic Intervention 
Psychotherapeutic intervention may prove necessary in children with traumatic 
experiences to provide emotional relief and to re-process some traumatic moments. As we 
described above, according to Pennebaker, Hughes, & Oheeron, (1987).), lack of 
emotional expressiveness or, vice versa, emotional stoicism will be harmful, whereas 
emotional expression should be helpful in strengthening immune functioning. Emotional 
expression in a psychotherapeutic context may consequently strengthen right hemispheric 
functioning which is necessary for emotional meaning and self-regulation. The possibility 
of expressing stress reactions openly within a socially supportive environment plays an 
important role in coping with stress. In further therapeutic interventions it may then 
become necessary to increase the capacity for readjusting the meaning of the original 
traumatic triggers, in order to learn how to relax and to restore personal integrity to one's 
self. Emotional support may be vitally necessary. Experiential psychotherapy (Greenberg, 
2002; Leijssen et al., 2000) as well as basic methods of supportive psychotherapy are 
recommended here, whereas in cases of sexual abuse and physical maltreatment use of a 
behavioral approach may be more directly effective, for example, by strengthening 
parental skills within adult education programs.  
For parents, interventions which target possibilities for mood altering, such as 
relaxation and music therapy, for instance could be appropriate, if they succeed in making 
parents more responsive to interactive coaching and to slight signs of improvement in their 
interactions (Field, 1998a, b). Parents might need to learn to anticipate and protect a child 
against possible external traumatic influences or even against the parents' own outbursts of 
aggression; in both cases, the parents should learn how to provide a sense of safety and 
security for the child. Family support, as from visiting nurses or home visiting parental 
aides, could be employed, as well as specific psycho-educative programs for the children 
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about abuse, teaching them how to become self-assertive to molesting parents (Kaplan & 
Pinner, 1996).  
 
Reversibility  
The process of reversibility has a high degree of relevancy to this topic: We know 
that cognitive functioning improves when mood improves (Brown et al., 1999; Richardson 
et al., 1994). Alterations in the hippocampus may be made reversible by learning to alterate 
a person's mood and lowering his or her cortisol levels, which in addition should further 
reduce the effects of aging. In this connection, Nelson (2000) discussed the plasticity of the 
brain and the possibilities of cortical reorganization in the young and adult brain; motor 
stimulation by playing a stringed instrument (Elbert et al., 1995) and sensory stimulation of 
the face (Pons, 1995) were suggested as well.  
 
Final Remarks 
In the theoretical discussion between neuroscientists who stress nature's influence, 
and psychologists who stress the role of social nurturing, the interface between 
neurophysiological and psychological environments is particularly relevant (Cicchetti & 
Tucker, 1994). Plasticity is an outcome of the temporally changing and dynamic relation of 
nature and nurture and a feature of development. The basis for change, for plasticity and 
for constraints in development lies in the relations that exist among the multiple levels 
necessary for living: biological, social, sociocultural and psychological (Csikszentmihalyi, 
1993). 
Future research should elucidate further the fine mechanisms influencing just how 
stress influences our neural networks and information processing, and which stressors 
sustain effects on the healthy information processing of the individual. In this context, it 
should be both exciting and rewarding to explore in greater detail what kind of 
environmental influences strengthen our neural and psychological system in the encounter 
with the demands of the world. The more we discover about the fine psychological and 
physiological influences on the organism, the more we will realize how to protect infants 
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from negative influences and how to ameliorate environmental influences. Plasticity of the 
brain refers to the potential for change, the possibilities for coping in an adaptive way with 
the negative influences we continuously meet in our environment. Many otherwise 
inexplicable mental and physiological phenomena could be prevented or eliminated if we 
were more aware of the sensibility of initial living. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
ENGAGEMENT OF LATERAL AND MEDIAL PREFRONTAL AREAS  IN THE 
ECPHORY OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Memory is divided into several systems of which the episodic-autobiographic 
system requiring conscious reflection and allowing a mental time travel into the past 
(Tulving and Markowitsch, 1998). Autobiographical memory allows humans to re-
experience our previous events associated with the awareness of the prior conscious event -
a self-reflective mental state, defined as autonoetic consciousness by Tulving (1985, 2002).  
As episodic-autobiographic system it requires conscious (self)-reflection and is 
considered to be the most complex (Tulving and Markowitsch, 1998). It gives individuals a 
sense of identity: we come to know who we are because of our past, the memory of your 
personal history. Due to its complexity, it is vulnerable to diverse forms of focal as well as 
diffuse brain damage and to various psychiatric problems, particularly in the field of stress, 
trauma, and dissociative disorders (Markowitsch, 1999, 2000). 
Both results from brain damaged patients (Kroll et al., 1997; Levine et al., 1998) 
and functional imaging studies (Fink et al., 1996) have stressed the special role of portions 
of the prefrontal cortex in higher complex psychological functions of the human such as 
memory processing as well as in theory of mind (Stuss et al., 2001), empathy and 
consciousness (Henson, et al. 1999; Knight and Grabowecky, 2000; Wheeler et al., 1997), 
emotion processing (Baker et al., 1997), self-recognition and personal identity (Keenan et 
al., 2000). 
This research relates to quite earlier studies, implicating in particular the 
orbitofrontal portion of the prefrontal lobes in a number of emotion-related processing 
patterns (Eslinger, 1999; Rolls, 1999), various personality dimensions (Harlow, 1848, 
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1869; Welt, 1888; Kleist, 1934) and processes such as directing attention to oneself 
(Goldenberg et al. 1999). 
Autobiographical memory shares many of these functions as it is specifically self-
centered, and concentrated towards the retrieval of past emotional happenings associated 
with a self-reflective state of consciousness or autonoetic consciousness (Tulving, 1985). 
A question of interest is whether in addition to a likely engagement of frontal lobe 
regions other brain areas are implicated differentially in the processing of sad versus happy 
old autobiographical memories. Limbic area, like portions of the prefrontal/orbitofrontal 
cortex, the ventral striatum and the amygdala are considered to process emotional 
information (Davidson, 2000; Davidson and Irwin, 1999; Mesulam, 2000; Morris and 
Dolan, 2001). 
Recent fMRI findings showed significant bilateral amygdala activations towards 
both positively and negatively valenced pictures but demonstrated that the arousal level 
modulated the amygdala response for negative but not for positive stimuli (Garavan et al., 
2001). The amygdala receives preprocessed polysensory information and its left and right 
nuclear complexes respond differently to different aspects of emotional stimuli 
(Markowitsch, 1998/99). In a review of Markowitsch (1998/99) it was concluded that the 
left amygdala is more closely related to affective encoding with a higher affinity for 
pictorial or image-related material. The right amygdala may be also more strongly engaged 
than the left one in a fast and global analysis of affect-related information. Other memory-
modulating area such as the hippocampus are expected to be activated. In a study of Fink 
and coworkers (1996) during the retrieval of old biographical memories, ventral prefrontal 
and temporal regions, including amygdalar and hippocampal areas were activated. Other 
area as the cingulated cortex (Fink et al. 1996; Markowitsch, 2000), the basal forebrain 
area and the precuneus may be activated (Fletcher et al. 2000; Shah et al. 2001). 
We used functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) in normal human subjects 
to address these questions of interaction between memory, emotion, and functional 
neuroanatomy. 
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2. METHODS 
 
2.1. SUBJECTS 
 
Subjects were 13 right-handed healthy volunteers (7 females, 7 males) from the 
Universities of Cologne and Frankfurt am Main. None had a history of previous 
neurological or psychiatric illnesses or syndromes. No gross brain abnormalities were 
found on magnetic resonance (MR) scans. All subjects were native German speakers. 
Informed consent was obtained from each subject prior to participation in this study. 
 
2.2. PROCEDURE 
 
 Subjects were told that psychologists have been studying memory for many years, 
but that there is still a need for research on the brain representation of autobiographical 
memory about positive and negative experiences. They were asked to retrieve 
autobiographic episodes of a positive and a negative content, evoked by a fixed set of key 
words, from the following periods of their life: (1) the first 12 years, (2) the period 
between years 12-18, (3) and that from age 18 to the present. Subjects were encouraged to 
provide episodes of a most intense character for both mood conditions. They were told that 
the investigators were not interested in particulars of the content, but in the general way in 
which different experiences are re-activated and memorized. 
The retrieved episodes were sorted with respect to the two conditions. Subjects 
were asked to rate and comment on the intensity of their positive or negative emotion for 
each provided episode. Subjects were asked to rate and comment on the intensity of their 
emotion for each provided episode. In spite of obviously differing in content between 
individuals, all episodes were carefully selected with respect to their emotionality and their 
prompt evocation. A mean intensity level of 7.8 for the positive- and a mean intensity level 
of 6.7 for the negative condition  was obtained which is consistent with the study of 
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D´Argembeau et al. (2002), for instance. While studying the phenomenal characteristics of 
autobiographical memories, they found that positive autobiographical episodes were more 
easily accessed, and tend to be more elaborated and more rehearsed compared to negative 
autobiographical episodes. The authors interpreted their findings as consistent with the 
general positive view most people possess from themselves. 
After the interview phase, subjects exercised using a computer program to become 
familiar with the key words and the time-constraints of the procedure. 
For brain scanning, subjects were instructed imagine the same episodes as before. 
The key sentences used in the interview were presented for 5 s on a screen. The screen was 
darkened for the next 20 s. Following a box-car design, every task (imagination) period of 
25 s alternated with a rest condition of the same length (5 scans each for rest and task). 
Aside from the two experimental conditions - ecphorizing negative and positive episodes - 
a third, control or baseline condition (REST), was used in addition. During REST, subjects 
had to fixate a small cross centered on the screen with light gray background (similarly as 
in the study of Fink et al., 1996). The higher luminance of the rest-screen indicated to the 
subjects to immediately stop their imaginations carried out in complete darkness. All 36 
cues (18 negative, 18 positive) were arranged in 2 blocks, consisting of 6 successive items 
of the same quality (6 negative first, than 6 positive, in fixed order), and 3 sessions 
(childhood, adolescence, recent past). The sequence of sessions (120 scans each) was 
counterbalanced between subjects. Before starting a session, the display showed them the 
imaginative "life period"; "you are a child" (or "adolescent", or "adult"). The questions 
depicted in table I were used. 
 
TABLE I 
Questions Used to Trigger Emotive Episodes from the Past 
 
A. Negative remembrances from childhood 
1. The first negative memory in your life, you remember truly. 
2. A situation in which you were very angry. 
3. A situation wherein you experienced anxiety. 
4. A situation where you were hurt. 
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5. A negative memory about a friend. 
6. A sad memory. 
B. Positive remembrances from childhood 
1. The first positive memory in your life, you remember truly. 
2. A positive event you can remember, for example a play situation. 
3. A birthday in your childhood. 
4. A positive memory about a good friend. 
5. A nice memory wherein you played with others. 
6. A nice holiday situation. 
C. Negative remembrances from adolescence 
1. A negative experience from your school-time. 
2. A close contact with another person, which evoked very awkward feelings. 
3. A very awkward situation wherein you were alone. 
4. A negative experience evoking massive stress. 
5. A shameful situation. 
6. A conflict with someone close. 
D. Positive remembrances from adolescence 
1. Feelings of being in love. 
2. A nice experience of success. 
3. A cheerful amusing adventure. 
4. A very agreeable situation with someone. 
5. A nice holiday. 
6. A very nice appointment. 
E. Negative remembrances from adulthood 
1. A situation wherein you worried a lot. 
2. A moment of deep sadness. 
3. The death of a beloved person. 
4. A situation in which you were exploited. 
5. A situation in which you were hurt. 
6. A situation in which you were jealous. 
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F. Positive remembrances from adulthood 
1. One of your nicest moments in the last years 
2. A very motivating positive situation. 
3. A happy moment. 
4. A really joyful situation. 
5. The memory of a very nice, intimate experience. 
6. A situation which made you very enthusiastic. 
 
 2.3. MRI HARDWARE AND TECHNICAL PARAMETERS  
 
Prior to the start of the experiment, subjects' brains were scanned with MRI to 
exclude morphological-pathological abnormalities. All fMRI measurements were 
performed on a 1.5 Tesla whole-body scanner (SIEMENS Vision) with standard head coil 
and using a standard EPI sequence (TR=5 s, TE= 66 ms, FA=90°, FoV=220; matrix 128 x 
128, voxel size= 1.64 x 1.64 x 5, scan time 2 s for 15 slices, 5 mm slice thickness). All 
fMRI scans were realigned to the initial scan from to correct for any head movement. 
Between each of the 3 sessions of 125 scans each (first 5 discarded) a short break was 
necessary for technical reasons to restart the EPI sequence for the next 125 measurements. 
Subjects were instructed to hold their position unchanged over sessions. Data analysis was 
performed using SPM (Worsley and Friston, 1997). After realignment of all 360 scans to 
the first scan, and spatial normalization to standard stereotactic space (Friston et al. 1995), 
images were smoothed applying a Gaussian kernel of 15 mm FWHM. Statistical analysis 
was then carried out in two stages. First, a fixed effect (within-subject) model was applied 
to the time series of every individual subject. After filtering (high-pass: 100 s, low-pass: 
hrf), and proportional scaling the images to overall grand mean, t-statistic maps (height 
threshold:  t=3.12) were generated for the contrasts (negative>rest), (positive>rest), 
(negative>positive) and (positive>negative) and a single contrast image was written out 
from the parameter estimates for each contrast and for every subject. Then, with one 
summary contrast 'scan' per subject, a second-level random effects analysis was conducted 
for these four contrasts, applying to a one-sample-t-test model. This approach takes the 
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between subjects variability into account and extends inference from the subjects studied 
to the overall population effects. The resulting activation maps were superimposed to the 
MNI template brain of SPM 99 (Figs. 1-3). 
 
 2.3. IMAGE ANALYSIS 
 
All possible permutations of each two of the three conditions negative, positive, 
rest were analyzed, applying contrast calculation within the general linear model approach 
provided by the SPM 99 software (two-level random effect analysis [Friston et al. 1995]). 
The most revealing comparisons were those between negative and positive episodes 
(negative>positive; positive>negative (Fig. 1). 
 
3. RESULTS 
 
The main results are a lateral orbitofrontal activation, when activating negative 
memory episodes, and a subcallosal-anterior cingulate activation, when activating positive 
ones. In literature, terminology used for these regions differs: Sometimes, they are referred 
to as limbic frontal or frontolimbic cortex, sometimes as orbitofrontal or basal frontal 
regions, and some authors use the term prefrontal even when addressing anterior cingulate 
and subcallosal regions (e.g., Gusnard et al., 2001; Simpson et al., 2001). The cingulate 
sulcus and para-cingulate gyrus are structurally variable, so that exact anatomical locations 
differ between subjects (cf. Paus et al., 1996). The negative>positive contrast (after 
random effect analysis) resulted in a major symmetrical activation of the lateral 
orbitofrontal cortices, possibly extending into the ventrolateral prefrontal cortices (see 
Table II), together with smaller activated regions in the right lateral temporal cortex and 
the left cerebellum (Figs. 1 and 3; Table II). Vice versa, the comparison of the retrieval of 
positive episodes with that of negative ones resulted in a major left hippocampal, a 
bilateral (with a preponderance to the right hemisphere, however) subgenual cingulate 
(Brodmann area 25) and a left dorsolateral-prefrontal activation (Table II). The medial 
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subcallosal activation was exactly below the genu of the corpus callosum (Figs. 1 and 3). 
All these activations were highly significant (second-level random effects analysis; height 
threshold t=3.93, puncorrected <.0001). Comparisions of the activated conditions with the 
condition REST resulted (for second-level analyses) in several significant activations for 
the comparisons positive>rest and negative>rest (Table II; Fig. 2). Regions in the right 
posterior temporal and anterior cingulate cortex, in the left dorsolateral and orbital frontal 
cortex, the left precuneus, the right lenticular nucleus, the medial cerebellar and the left 
ventral pallidal - dorsal amygdalar region were activated (Table II; Fig. 2). 
 
Table II  
Areas activated in the condition of negative relative to positive autobiographic 
memory.  
Region, Gyrus x y z z-statistics 
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex, left -52 24 -2 3.52
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex, right 54 34 -6 3.79
Lateral temporal cortex 64 -28 -12 3.90
Cerebellum, left -10 -60 -24 3.99
 
Areas activated in the condition of positive relative to negative autobiographic 
memory.  
Region, Gyrus x y z z-statistics 
Medial orbifrontal cortex, R 14 26 -10 3.77
Medial orbifrontal cortex, L -24 24 48 3.79
Hippocampal region, L -30 -28 -16 4.10
Dorsolateral prefrontal cortex -24 24 48 3.79
3. Neural Correlates of Autobiographical Memory 
 
 
 
 
-90- 
- 
 
Areas activated in the condition of negative autobiographic memory relative to rest.  
Region, Gyrus x y z z-statistics 
Anterior cingulated gyrus (area 24/32), L 12 20 26 4.89
Lateral orbitofrontal cortex (area  47), L -44 44 10 4.84
Lenticular nucleus, R 28 10 2 4.81
Cerebellum, medial 4 -48 -18 4.22
 
Areas activated in the condition of positive autobiographic memory relative to rest.  
Region, Gyrus x y z z-statistics 
Posterior temporal gyrus (area 37) 32 -56 2 5.99
Anterior cing. gyrus (area 24/32), R 14 16 28 5.37
Medial frontal gyrus, L -16 20 48 5.19
Superior frontal gyrus, L -12 -45 4 5.12
Precuneus, L -26 -58 16 5.09
Ventral pallidal/dorsal amygd. Reg., L -22 -4 -4 5.29
 
 
The main results are a differential orbitofrontal activation, which is lateral when 
activating negative memory episodes and medial when activating positive ones. All these 
activations were highly significant, after second-level random effects analysis (height 
threshold t=3.93, uncorrected< .0001). Figures 1, 2 and 3 illustrate our main results. 
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Figure 1. Functional anatomy of the negative>positive (red) and the positive>negative 
(green) comparisons. A coronal, sagittal, and transverse plane of an arbitrary magnetic 
resonance image is shown at the level providing the most significant activations. negative-
positive activations are found bilaterally in the lateral orbitofrontal cortex and to a minor 
degree in the right temporal cortex. Vice versa, the positive>negative comparison led to a 
strong bilateral medial orbitofrontal activation, a left hippocampal and a left dorsolateral 
prefrontal activation. 
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Figure 2. Projections of activations onto representations of the standard stereotactic space 
as defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988) ("SPM-99 glass brains"). The top three maps 
show the activations for the negative>positive, and the bottom tree for the 
positive>negative comparison. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
This study centers on old autobiographical memory retrieval and emphasizes the 
link between emotion and memory. The activity patterns are very distinct and differ 
considerably between negatively and positively experienced episodes. The activations are, 
with exception of the cerebellar one, all (cerebral) cortical and largely confined to limbic 
or paralimbic regions.  
Especially, the orbitofrontal and subcallosal cortex turns out to be a major hub for 
the retrieval of emotional memories. Within this area there is a clear separation between 
regions engaged in the retrieval or ecphory of positive and negative episodes of the distant 
past. 
 
4.1. Orbitofrontal-Subcallosal Area 
 
The orbitofrontal cortex and its immediately adjacent prefrontal and anterior ventral 
cingulate regions are shown to be major trigger stations for ecphorizing emotionally 
colored episodes of the distant past. The orbitofrontal and adjacent subcallosal cortex 
receives input from (other) prefrontal and posterior cortical integration areas as well as 
from many limbic regions, representing the hierarchical apex of this system. As a 
consequence of intimate interconnection onto limbic area, it has been therefore conceived 
as an "association cortex" for the limbic forebrain (Pribram, 1981).  
The orbitofrontal cortex has an important function in social knowing how to 
behave, the selection of appropriate behavior, or social and interpersonal selfregulation 
(Bechara et al., 2000; Esslinger et al. 1995; Rolls, 1999, 2000; Shammi & Stuss, 1999). 
Elliot, Dolan, and Frith, (2000) suggested that the orbitofrontal cortex signalizes the likely 
value or behavioral relevance of available choices of action, whereby it is not exactly 
known, how the functions become expressed. The sensitivity to the reward-relatedness of 
information of the orbitofrontal cortex plays a role in stimulus association learning, 
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especially in unclear or unpredictable situations (Thorpe et al. 1983, Rolls, 1999). 
Furthermore, decoding and readjusting the reinforcement value of stimuli seems to be an 
important function of the orbitofrontal cortex (Rolls, 1999). This kind of general 
supervisory or controlling function was also stressed by Raine et al. (1998) in the 
interpretation of their findings of orbitofrontal changes in murderers. They, as well as other 
researchers (Bechara et al., 2000), assume the orbitofrontal cortex to be involved in high 
level judgment, implicating the anticipation of consequences, empathy and decision 
making. 
Lateral and medial portions of this basal frontal cortex have different networks of 
connectivity. The medial sector is particularly related to hippocampal and 
parahippocampal regions, and the posterior cingulate and retrosplenial areas, while the 
lateral section has strong connections with the amygdala, sensory and premotor regions 
(Cavada et al., 2000). This division corresponds (a) to the selective medial subgenual (and 
left hippocampal) activation when ecphorizing positively valued episodes, and (b) to the 
selective lateral orbitofrontal activation, when remembering negative or sad episodes (it 
has repeatedly been stressed that the amygdala evaluates negative or particularly intense 
emotions to a higher degree than positive ones; (Canli et al., 2000; Markowitsch, 1998/99). 
Also the findings of Frey et al. (2000) of area 13 involvement in the processing of 
unpleasant auditory information and that of Simpson et al. (2001) of medial 
orbitofrontal/subgenual involvement during anticipatory anxiety are of relevance in this 
respect.  
We cannot determine whether the activation in the two disparate loci reflects the 
triggering of the respective episodes or is used to influence (e.g., suppress) the respective 
other circuit. For this last hypothesis speak the findings of Zubieta et al. (1999), who found 
a medial frontal engagement in posttraumatic stress symptoms, and of Elliot et al. (2000), 
who suggested from their findings that activation of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex may 
reflect the suppression of previously rewarded responses. (However, they also referred to 
an activation of the lateral orbitofrontal cortex when viewing an angry face.) For the first 
hypothesis, on the other hand, speaks the result of Blood, et al. (1999) who found that 
emotional responses to pleasant music correlated with medial orbitofrontal activation. 
Price (1999) referred to PET data which showed increased blood flow in the lateral 
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orbitofrontal cortex in patients with unipolar depression (compared to normals) and 
decreased blood flow in medial frontal regions in bipolar, manic-depressive patients, in 
their depressed phase, suggesting again a differential involvement of these two basal 
frontal sectors in emotional processing. Gusnard et al. (2001) hypothesized from their 
findings with functional magnetic resonance imaging that the region they term medial 
prefrontal cortex (and which with respect to anatomical co-ordinates closely resembles our 
medial anterior orbital/subcallosal area) is engaged in aspects of the self ("self-referentiual 
mental activity"), which they found when letting subjects determine which of presented 
pictures were pleasant or unpleasant. The interaction between memory and emotion 
consequently seems to be central for the self (Natsoulas, 1995, p. 318; Markowitsch, in 
press).  
There are a few results which may be viewed as at variance with our findings of a 
medial anterior cingulate/subcallosal activation when ecphorizing positively valued 
episodes and a lateral orbitofrontal activation when ephorizing negatively valued ones: 
Mayberg and co-workers (Mayberg et al., 1999; Liotti et al., 2000) found in a PET-study 
sadness related activity increases in the subgenual cingulate cortex and Drevets et al. 
(1998) found that the subgenual prefrontal cortical volume is reduced in patients with 
major depressive disorder.  
These observations might, however, indicate that this cortical region, in fact, 
processes positively valued information in normal, non-depressed subjects. Alternatively, 
or in addition, it could process both positively and negatively valued episodes, but with 
varying strength or engagement. Evidence for this view was provided by Rolls (2000) and 
Ochsner et al. (2001). Rolls (2000) reviewed neuroimaging results which showed that 
"areas of the orbitofrontal cortex (and connected subgenual cingulate cortex) are activated 
by pleasant touch, by painful touch, by rewarding and aversive taste, and by odor" (p. 284). 
Ochsner et al. (2001) suggested from their findings in a patient with bilateral anterior 
cingulotomy that one "of the anterior cingulate's roles may be to monitor on-line 
processing and signal the motivational significance of current actions or cognitions" (p. 
219), indicating a more general role of this cortex in information processing. 
Recently, the group of Tulving (Lepage et al., 2000) also found anterior cingulate 
activations during memory retrieval tasks and proposed that neuronal activity in this region 
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is correlated with the maintenance of episodic memory retrieval mode, a condition 
necessary for remembering past episodes. In this article, they also provided a new 
interpretation of their HERA model (hemispheric encoding retrieval asymmetry) by 
writing that the previously assumed strict right hemispheric activation during episodic 
retrieval should be replaced by a bilateral, though more prominently right hemispheric 
activation - a revision fitting our present data. In conclusion, spatially different and distinct 
portions of the human basal frontal cortex seem to work as hubs within wider and 
primarily cortical nets engaged in ecphorizing old autobiographic episodes of a positive or 
negative character.  
 
4.2. Dorsal Prefrontal Cortex 
 
A left dorsolateral prefrontal activation (together with a left hippocampal one) 
during the retrieval of positive episodes was observed. The left dorsolateral prefrontal 
cortex is involved in a number of functions, above all, in the encoding of episodic and 
semantic information (Tulving et al., 1994; Nolde et al., 1998). In literature, it was also 
suggested that this region of the brain is engaged in 'working with meaning' (Kapur et al., 
1994), an interpretation fitting the present design. The retrieval of episodes is accompanied 
by their re-encoding, which might be an explanation for the left dorsolateral activation. 
The selective activation under the condition positive memory- relative to negative memory 
retrieval is most likely related to the significance threshold set. Reduced activation of the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex has been found in several psychiatric diseases, as in 
schizophrenia (Selemon et al., 1999); furthermore, damage to the left dorsolateral 
prefrontal cortex is associated with clinical depression (Baxter, 1989; Martinot, 1990; 
Robinson, 1996). 
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4.3. Hippocampal Formation 
 
The hippocampal formation is that brain area that becomes associated with 
memory. The role of the hippocampus in retrieval however, remains a topic of discussion 
(Maguire et al. 2001), especially as it is seems to be impossible to distinguish between 
mere retrieval and retrieval accompanied by the re-encoding of the retrieved information 
(Tulving and Markowitsch, 1997, 1998). This has to do with the largely unsolved nature of 
memory consolidation (Ambrogi Lorenzini, 1999; Knowlton and Fanselow, 1998; Lechner 
et al., 1999; McGaugh, 2000; Moscovitch and Nadel, 1998; Sara, 2000). Tulving and 
Markowitsch (1998) discusses the hippocampus as necessary in the acquisition and 
remembering of episodic memories, but not necessarily in the acquisition of semantic 
memories.  
Psychiatric patients demonstrate anatomical deviations in the hippocampal region 
(Deicken et al., 1998; Whitworth et al., 1998). Heckers et al., (1998) found an impaired 
recruitment of the hippocampus during conscious recollection in schizophrenia and it is 
argued quite frequently that the disturbed cognitive functions in schizophrenia may be a 
result of fronto-hippocampal disconnection (Csernansky et al., 1998; Fletcher, 1998), an 
interpretation fitting the combined ventral prefrontal and hippocampal activation seen 
under the condition positive memories in comparison with negative memories. An 
interaction between ventral prefrontal and hippocampal regions has been proposed both 
from anatomical (Lavenex and Amaral, 2000) and functional (Mesulam, 2000) points of 
view. It seems therefore possible to consider the principal activation pattern as reflecting a 
neuronal circuitry for emotional evaluation of memorized episodes, possibly more so of 
those with a positive affective background. Alternatively and in addition, the hippocampal 
activation could indicate that this region is indeed involved in information retrieval, at least 
for a limited period of time. As we combined three time periods we could not determine 
whether there is a greater activation for the retrieval of more recent as opposed to more 
remote memories (cf. Moscovitch and Nadel, 1998). Possibly, the left hemisphere might 
became just significant, while the right hemisphere did not. Or that retrieving old episodes, 
positively valued episodes, engages the hippocampal formation of the left hemisphere. 
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Several factors do play a role in the issue of laterality. Nolde et al. (1998) suggested for 
instance that more demanding retrieval tasks of perceptually detailed information elicit left 
prefrontal activation as well, whereas simple memory retrieval tasks elicit right prefrontal 
activation. In a study of Ranganath et al. (2000), left activation was reliably engaged 
during retrieval trials of pictures and objects and increased with demands to retrieve 
perceptually detailed information about the studied items. 
 
4.4. Cerebellum 
 
The significant left hemispheric cerebellar activation corresponds to the findings of 
others, suggesting that particularly the left cerebellum is engaged in several nonmotor 
mental activities, among them episodic memory retrieval (Andreasen et al., 1999; Buckner 
and Tulving, 1995; Cabeza and Nyberg, 2000; Fink et al., 1996; Tulving et. al., 1994), and 
attribution or experience of emotion (Lane, 1996; Paradiso et al., 1999). The cerebellum 
appears to be generally involved in conscious processes (Edelman, 1989). 
In the study of Andreasen et al. (1999) subjects intentionally recalled a specific past 
personal episodic memory. The authors suggested the participation of the cerebellum in an 
interactive cortical-cerebellar network initiating and monitoring the conscious retrieval of 
episodic memory. Probably cerebellar neurons provide a sequencing time code or a 
temporal programming to ecphorized events. 
 
4.5. Lateral Temporal Cortex 
 
The selective engagement of a right-hemispheric region of the lateral temporal 
gyrus during the retrieval of negative episodes may reflect a somewhat more controlled, 
less emotional access of negative compared to positive episodes. Also, in old work of Flor-
Henry (1969) on patients with epilepsy, he found that psychotic behavior is more likely 
associated with dysfunction of the left, "dominant in his words", than of the right temporal 
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lobe, which is associated with depressive behavior. The temporal region probably reflects 
the particular engagement of an actual storage places of the engrams (Chen et al., 1996; 
Miyashita et al., 1998; Sakai and Miyashita, 1994). 
 
4.6. Amygdala 
 
The amygdala can be viewed as that structure that gives episodic memory its 
emotional flavor (Sarter and Markowitsch, 1985). As a consequence, the amygdala might 
be expected to be activated during the retrieval of old autobiographical memories (Dolan et 
al., 2000; Fink et al., 1996; Markowitsch, 1998/99; Markowitsch et al., 2000). Indeed, this 
was found when comparing retrieval of positive memories with the rest condition. The 
comparisons of principal interest, however, namely positive- relative to negative and 
negative- relative to positive, apparently cancelled the amygdala activation out, which 
most likely existed in either condition (Fink et al., 1996; Markowitsch, 1998/99; 
Markowitsch et al., 2000). Different intertwined influences may be at work here: 
habituation (Wright, 2001), sexe differences in amygdaloid activation during memory 
retrieval (Cahill et al. 2001) and during sadness (Schneider et al. 2000). These factors may 
have resulted in this selective activation pattern in one condition and not in the others. 
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study provided evidence for an engagement of portions of the 
orbitofrontal/ventral prefrontal cortex in the retrieval of retrograde emotional live-events. 
A differential activation is demonstrated towards past autobiographical events that were 
viewed as clearly positive in character and events that were viewed as clearly negative in 
character. The results complements earlier ones in which it was found that the retrieval of 
old episodes activates a temporo-frontal network of structures for which the expression 
"expanded limbic system" (Nauta, 1979) can be used (Fink et al., 1996; Markowitsch et al., 
2000). Especially areas within the prefrontal lobe can be described as acting in a dynamic 
3. Neural Correlates of Autobiographical Memory 
 
 
 
 
-100- 
- 
interplay between cognition and emotion (Simpson et al., 2001a, b). From our findings it 
can be concluded that different anatomical networks engage in the ecphory of positively 
and negatively rated biographical events. It can furthermore be concluded that cortical 
structures provide a significant contribution to the processing of affective memories. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
BI-HEMISPHERIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE RETRIEVAL OF 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NEUTRAL, STRESSFUL POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE 
EPISODES 
 
AUTOBIOGRAPHIC MEMORY - PROTOTYPE OF EPISODIC MEMORY 
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Episodic autobiographical memory concerns the recollection of specific life-events 
through subjective time the present, the past to the future. It is accompanied by a self-
reflective mental state state of consciousness, entitled autonoetic consciousness by Tulving 
(1985, 2002). Tulving (2002) defined episodic memory as cognitive, symbolic and 
declaratively representable. Its operations depend on the underlying semantic memory 
systems. As the main subset of episodic memory, it is directed towards the ecphory of past 
emotional happenings. (Tulving, 1983, considers ecphory as the process whereby cues for 
retrieval interact with stored information so that an image or a representation of the 
information occurs.) Within autobiographical memory, a main emotional distinction exists 
between memories of positive versus negative valence (Markowitsch et al., 2003; Piefke, 
et al., 2003). In a functional magnetic resonance imaging study on neural correlates of 
happy and sad autobiographical memories circumscribed regions within the orbitofrontal 
cortex were found (Markowitsch et al., 2003). Piefke, Weiss, Zilles, Markowitsch, and 
Fink, (2003), studying the neural correlates of differential remoteness and emotional tone 
in autobiographical memory, found (irrespective of remoteness and emotional tone) 
bilateral activations in medial and lateral temporal, temporo-occipital, posterior cingulate 
and frontal cortices. The results also demonstrated a time-dependent involvement of the 
hippocampal region. Also, the orbitofrontal as well as the entorhinal cortex and adjacent 
medial temporobasal areas were observed to be differentially more active in positive 
compared to negative autobiographical memory retrieval.  
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In this context, it is still a controversially discussed question whether the right, 
compared to the left hemisphere contributes more intensely and more directly to the 
retrieval of affect-laden memories. Both the HERA-(hemispheric and encoding retrieval 
asymmetry) model (Tulving, et al., 1994) and a number of more recent findings, both from 
functional neuroimaging (Buckner, et al., 1998; Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Fletcher, et al., 
1998; McDermott et al., 1999; Nyberg, et al., 1996; Habib et al., 2003) and from case 
reports of brain damaged patients (Eslinger, 1999; Markowitsch, 1995, 2000) all 
emphasize a stronger role of the right hemisphere. This would be in keeping with the idea 
of Stuss and Alexander (2000) to view the right hemisphere as a convergence zone of 
affect and cognition. The right frontal lobe, in interaction with the right temporal lobe, 
would serve as a specific convergence site for neural processes essential for affect-laden 
experiences of the self  (Markowitsch, 2003a, 2003c).  
Recent morphological measurements, in which a considerably larger right 
(compared to left) hemispheric interconnection between frontal and temporal regions via 
the uncinate fascicle was found, support this view further (Highley et al., 2002). Both the 
higher degree of anatomical interconnectivity and the cognitive richness and emotional 
value of autobiographical old memories make these more vulnerable to brain damage and 
other external and internal influences (Knowlton & Fanselow, 1998; Markowitsch, 1995, 
2000, 2003b; Moscovitch & Nadel, 1998; Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998).  
On the other hand, other authors emphasize a left-hemispheric contribution to 
episodic memory retrieval (Lee et al., 2002; Nolde et al., 1998). Our study aimed to 
contribute to a solution between these extremes by using memories of various valences, 
stressful and neutral memories, and additionally, by requiring the subjects to intensely 
imagine their autobiographical episodes.  
Autobiographical memory includes emotional memory ranging from neutral 
towards negative, positive and stressful memories. Stress, as viewed here, is a 
quantitatively specifiable variable which superposes the positivity or negativity of an 
event. Phenomenological examples of states of stress or pressure situations are non-
specific or specific time pressure (e.g., having to submit a paper before a deadline is 
reached) or the wish to have to be better than someone else (e.g., in a sport situation). The 
inclusion of stressful memories was also considered to be important, as stressful incidents 
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may lead to a block of autobiographical memory retrieval and may change the activity of 
specific brain regions (Markowitsch et al., 1999; Markowitsch et al., 2000), most likely 
due to changes in brain metabolism such as an increased release of stress hormones and the 
block of receptor channels in memory sensitive areas (Markowitsch, 2002).  
Using functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), the present study addresses 
the question whether autobiographical memories of positive, negative, stressful, or neutral 
character recruit similar or different neural networks. Obtained results should have 
implications for the classification of memory tasks with respect to systems, laterality and 
processes. 
 
2. METHODS 
 
2.1. SUBJECTS 
 
Subjects were 16 right-handed healthy women of 21 to 32 years of age. None had a 
history of previous neurological or psychiatric illnesses or syndromes. No brain 
abnormalities were found on magnetic resonance scans. All subjects were native German 
speakers. Informed consent was obtained from each subject prior to participation. Only 
female subjects participated in order to account for possible gender effects (Cahill et al., 
2001; Nyberg et al., 2000; Schneider et al., 2000). On the behavioral level, Lang, 
Greenwald, Bradley, and Hamm (1993) found that women are more likely to report more 
intense emotional experiences and show more physiological reactivity in accordance with 
valence judgements than men do. 
 
2.2. PROCEDURE 
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Prior to brain scanning, subjects were informed that psychologists have studied 
memory for decades, but that there would still be a need for research on the brain 
representation of autobiographical memory. They were then asked to retrieve 
autobiographic episodes, corresponding to the four conditions - neutralL, stressful, 
negative, and positive - evoked by a fixed set of 24 standard key sentences (6 sentences per 
category; questions are given in Table 1). To increase the basis for a similar intensity of the 
selected memories, three additional (reserve) cue-sentences were given. For neutral and 
stressful episodes, subjects were encouraged to provide events as neutral and as stressful as 
possible. For negative and positive episodes, they were encouraged to provide events with 
an emotional degree of intensity, vividness and detail as high as possible. They were told 
that the investigators were not interested in details of the content, but in generalizable 
explanations, how different experiences are re-activated and memorized in the brain.  
Subjects practiced the recall of autobiographical memories by associating cue-
words (specified before from their retrieved episodes) with the to-be-retrieved episodes. 
This procedure corresponds to the one used before in several of our functional imaging 
studies (Fink et al., 1996; Markowitsch et al., 2000, 2003; Piefke et al., 2003) and allowed 
individuals to familiarize with the procedure employed during scanning. Brain scanning 
was done on the day of the interview whereby subjects were instructed to re-imagine their 
original episodes by pairs of cue-words. These were presented acoustically in a completely 
darkened environment. Subjects were instructed to keep their eyes closed throughout the 
experimental session. To control for episodic "floating" during the condition of rest, 
subjects were instructed to imagine a cross the experimentator had shown before against a 
white background. Following an alternation ("boxcar") design, every task (imagination) 
period of 30 s alternated with a rest condition of the same length (6 scans each for rest and 
task). All 24 cues (each 6 neutral, stressful, positive, negative) were arranged in four 
blocks, consisting of six successive items of the same quality. The sequence of sessions 
was counterbalanced between the subjects, rather then randomized to avoid variable order 
artefacts.  
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TABLE I. 
Questions Used to Trigger Emotive Episodes from the Past 
 
1. Neutral memories 
1. Gardening situation. 
2. Shopping situation. 
3. Lunch situation. 
4. Working situation. 
5. Cooking situation. 
6. Cleaning situation.  
2. Stressful memories 
1. Stress situation. 
2. Difficult examination. 
3. Time pressure. 
4. Important appointment. 
5. Something  lost. 
6. Work stress. 
3. Negative memories 
1.Death of beloved person. 
2. Sad situation. 
3. Situation of loneliness. 
4. Being hurt. 
5. Situation of hopelessness. 
6. Disappointment. 
4.  Positive memories 
1.  Being in love. 
2.  Happy moment. 
3.  Cheerful party. 
4.  Joyful situation. 
5.  Nice holiday. 
6. Nice appointment. 
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Post-scan debriefing  
After scanning, to ascertain the remembering of the cue-sentences and related 
association of the respective memory enduring the scan-measurements, subjects were again 
asked to fill out a questionnaire with feature characteristics defined in the following items: 
how emotional, positive, experiental vivid each episode was, and in what visual detail they 
remembered the episodes. These characteristics had to be rated on scales from 1=not at all, 
2=scarcely, 3=slightly, 4=fairly, 5=much so, 6=very much so. Subjects were paid for their 
participation. 
 
2.3. MRI  HARDWARE AND TECHNICAL PARAMETERS 
 
MRI scans were carried out using a 1.5 T scanner (Siemens MAGNETOM 
Symphony, Erlangen, Germany) equipped with a standard head coil and with echoplanar 
imaging capability. To position the axial T2*-weighted images along the AC-PC line, 
scout and sagittal T1-weighted images were obtained in every subject. Functional imaging 
volumes were acquired according to a block paradigm, where a baseline condition was 
alternated with a stimulus condition. During each block which was lasting 30 s, 10 sets of 
16 axial T2*-weighted MR-slices with a slice thickness of 7 mm were obtained using a 
standard EPI sequence (TR = 1600 ms, TE = 50 ms, field of view (FOV) 192 mm, matrix 
64x64). The volumes covered the whole brain. To provide an anatomical reference and to 
exclude gross brain pathology, a T1-weighted 3D-sequence (MPRAGE, TR = 11.08 ms, 
TE = 4.3 ms, slice thickness 1.5 mm, FOV 201x230 mm, matrix 224 x 256) was obtained 
in every subject. 
 
2.4. STATISTICAL ANALYSIS 
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All images were exported from the measurement console to a SUN workstation. 
Before intra-run realignment of the functional data sets, the first two images were skipped 
to account for T1 saturation effects during the first scans. The remaining images were 
analyzed using SPM99, which was used for image pre-processing as well as for a voxel-
based statistical analysis within the context of the General Linear Model (GLM). To 
correct for head movements, the images were realigned using the SPM99 default 
algorithm. Prior to group comparisons, anatomical differences were compensated for by 
means of a spatial normalization using the SPM99 default settings and the standard 
stereotactic space, i.e. the MNI brain (Montreal Neurological Institute). Then a spatial 
smoothing was carried on with a Gaussian kernel of 10 mm full-width-half-maximum 
(FWHM), to increase both signal and anatomical conformity. 
  A fixed-effects statistical analysis for all permutations of the four conditions 
(neutral, positive,  negative, stress) was done on a voxel-by-voxel basis. Differences 
between conditions were assessed individually as well as for the group of subjects. After 
filtering (high-pass: 120 s, low-pass: hrf) t-statistic maps were generated for all contrasts 
and a single contrast image was generated from the parameter estimates for each contrast 
and for every subject. Then, with such a single summary image per subject, a random 
effects analysis was conducted for the contrasts (neutral-rest, stressful-rest, negative-rest, 
positive-rest, neutral, negative, positive-rest and neutral, stressful, negative, positive-rest), 
applying to a one sample t-test model. This approach takes into account the inter-subject 
variability and extends inference from the subjects studied to overall population effects. 
The resulting activation maps were superimposed to the MNI brain template of SPM99. 
Activations were projected onto representations of the standard stereotactic space as 
defined by Talairach and Tournoux (1988) ("SPM-99 glass brains"). 
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3. RESULTS 
 
Brain activations 
The four different types of autobiographical memory - neutral, stressful, negative 
and positive memories - were compared with each other and with rest. Comparisons 
between the different autobiographical memory types did not reveal significant results, 
probably due to the shared emotional and self-referential character of autobiographical 
memory per se. (A second possibility is that to get significant differences for four 
conditions, more memories per condition are needed. The latter option was not possible 
given the length of the task and the strong task demands the subjects already had to fulfil.)  
The random effect analysis with rest showed the following results (cf. Table 2):  
1. In neutral memory compared to rest, prefrontal areas were active: the inferior and 
middle frontal gyri, the orbitofrontal and the dorsolateral cortex. Aside from prefrontal 
activations, the anterior and posterior cingulate gyrus, the parietal lobes and the occipital 
cortex were activated on the left side. 
2. The contrast of stressful autobiographical memory compared to rest revealed left 
prefrontal activations (inferior, middle and superior frontal cortex), as well as activations 
of the right anterior and left posterior cingulate cortex and the left parietal lobes. In  this 
condition - but not in the comparison of neutral memory vs. rest - the lateral temporal lobes 
were activated bilaterally.  
3. The comparison of negative memory with rest resulted in major bilateral 
contributions of the prefrontal and temporal lobes (Fig. 1). Within the prefrontal cortex, 
left orbitofrontal and dorsolateral cortex as well as bilateral anterior medial to superior 
frontal cortical regions were activated. In the temporal lobe, activity was observed in the 
lateral lobes (left middle and bilaterally the superior anterior temporal gyrus), and within 
the medial temporal lobes, the parahippocampal/hippocampal area. As for neutral and 
stressful memory conditions (compared to rest), activity was observed in the left parietal 
lobes, with activations in both posterior and anterior areas, and also in the left anterior 
cingulate area. 
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4. Positive memory relative to rest resulted in major contributions of the bilateral 
prefrontal cortex and temporal lobes. Within the prefrontal cortex, the inferior-
orbitofrontal, dorsolateral and anterior medial-to-superior frontal cortices were activated 
bilaterally. In the temporal lobe, activity was observed in the lateral lobes within the left 
middle and, bilaterally, the superior anterior temporal gyri. Within the medial temporal 
lobes, parahippocampal/hippocampal areas were activated. As in neutral and stressful 
memory, both posterior and anterior areas of the left parietal lobes were engaged. Also, the 
left cingulate gyrus became active. 
5. In the combined condition (neutral, negative and positive autobiographical 
memory) versus rest, again a common pattern of bilateral prefrontal and temporal lobe 
activations was found. Within the prefrontal lobe, activation was found bilaterally in the 
inferior-orbitofrontal cortex, the left dorsolateral cortex and, again bilaterally, in the 
anterior medial-to-superior frontal cortex. Within the lateral temporal lobe, the left middle 
and both superior anterior temporal gyri were activated. Within the medial temporal lobes, 
the left parahippocampal/hippocampal areas were active. As in the single conditions of 
neutral, stressful, negative and positive memory, there was involvement of the left inferior 
parietal lobes, left posterior cingulate cortex and right cerebellum.  
6. For the combination of negative, positive, and stressful autobiographical memory 
versus rest, prefrontal and temporal lobe activations were dominant. Within the prefrontal 
lobe, as in the preceding condition (neutral, negative and positive memories relative to 
rest), activation was found bilaterally in the inferior-orbitofrontal cortex, the left 
dorsolateral cortex and, again bilaterally, in the anterior medial-to-superior frontal cortex. 
Within the medial temporal lobes, the left hippocampus, and the right parahippocampus 
were active. As in the other conditions, the left inferior parietal lobes, the left posterior 
cingulate gyrus and the cerebellum were active bilaterally. 
7. Comparisons of the combination of every type of memory (neutral, stressful, 
negative and positive) resulted in a similar activation pattern with bilateral inferior frontal, 
left middle frontal/dorsolateral and right superior frontal lobe engagements. Within the 
lateral temporal lobes, the left middle and both superior anterior temporal lobes were 
active. Within the medial temporal lobes, the left parahippocampus and hippocampus were 
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activated. Also, the left anterior and posterior cingulate, the left inferior and posterior 
parietal lobes, and the right cerebellum were active.  
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Table II.  
 
Areas activated in the condition of neutral autobiographic memory relative to rest. .  
Region, Gyrus BA x y z z-statistics
Inferior frontal gyrus  (44) -39 13 27  5.12
Middle frontal gyrus  (8) -33 11 47  5.63
Middle   ,,      ,,                    (6,8) -30 23 44 4.87
Orbitofrontal cortex          (11/47) -36 40 -15  6.03
Dorsolateral cortex (46) -48 27 24 4.56
Posterior cingulate gyrus (23/30) -9 -55 10 5.62
Anterior    ,,     ,,         (32) -6 19 39 5.36
Parietal lobes, precuneus  (7) -15 -70 49  5.65
                ,,      ,, (7) -27 -71 46  5.57
Inferior parietal lobes (40) -36 -71 41  5.47
Superior occipital cortex (19) -36 -80 29 4.67
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Areas activated in the condition of stressful autobiographic memory relative to rest  
Region, Gyrus BA x y z z-statistics
Inferior frontal gyrus/ orbitofr. (47) -45 23 -4 Inf. 
Orbitofrontal cortex  (11) -36 43 -15 5.21
Middle frontal gyrus (9) -45 5 38 Inf
                ,,      ,, (47) -48 40 -7 4.75
Superior     ,,      ,, (10) -36 58 -3 6.11
Dorsolateral cortex (6)  -6 17 45 Inf
Anterior cingulate gyrus  (32)  12 22 38 5.74
Posterior ,,      , (23)  -6 -55 10 5.70
Medial temporal lobe (21)  24 -8 22 6.99
Middle temporal lobes (21) -48 -38 -6  4.92
,,      ,, (21) -36 -44 0 5.23
Parietal Lobe, precuneus   (39) -36 -74 34 4.87
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Areas activated in the condition of negative autobiographic memory relative to rest.  
Region, Gyrus BA x y z z-statistics
Inferior  frontal gyrus/ orbitofr. (47) -48 26 -6 Inf. 
Middle frontal gyrus/sup. Dorsol.g.  (8) -36 14 47 Inf.
                ,,      ,, (9) -42 14 42 Inf
                ,,      ,, (10) -30 61 -3 7.67
 (10) -27 56 20 6.36
Superior  frontal  gyrus  (9/10) -9 60 27 6.79
                ,,      ,, (10) -6 65 17 5.65
                ,,      ,, (8)  -21 43 38 5.13
                ,,      ,, (9/10)  12 60 27 4.85
                ,,      ,, (10)  9 65 22 4.59
Medial  temporal lobe (21)  -56 -7 -20 6.11
 (21) -33 -8 -23  4.91
Superior anterior  temporal g. (38) -45 10 -31 7.12
                ,,      ,, (38) 36 10 -36 4.54
                ,,      ,, (38) -45 16 -31 5.59 
Parahippoca,mp.  G./Hippocampus (36) -24 -46 -27 5.33
                ,,      ,, (28/36) -39 -65 36 5.49
Posterior  parietal lobe (23/31) -6 -54 23 5.03
Anterior cingulated gyrus  (32)  -6 17 42 Inf
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Areas activated in the condition of positive autobiographic memory relative to rest.  
Region, Gyrus BA x y z z-statistics
Inferior frontal gyrus  (47)  45 26 -7  5.27
Orbitofrontal gyrus  (11)  24 43 -16  5.64 
,,      ,, (47/11) -48 43 -10  4.54
Middle frontal gyrus  (6/8) -36 14 47  Inf
,,      ,, (10) -39 55 0  5.47
Middle frontal gyrus/dorsolat. g.     (6/8)  -3 20 44  Inf
,,      ,, (9)  45 19 34  7.75
 ,,      ,, (10)  -6 52 -5  Inf
,,      ,, (10)  -6 55  2  7.68 
Superior frontal gyrus  (10) -12 60  25  6.21 
,,      ,, (10) -27 56 17  5.13
,,      ,,  (9/10)  12 60  27  5.83 
Inferior temporal gyrus  (20/36) -33 -10 -32  5.24
,,      ,, (20) -53 -19 -22  4.61
Middle temporal gyrus (21) -53 -7 -20  6.25
Hippocampus/parahippocampus  (28) -15 -18 -17  6.23
Superior anterior temporal g.  (38)   45 19 -29  6.02 
,,      ,, (38)  -39 16 -34  5.63
Cingulate gyrus (ant.-post.)      (23/30)  -6 -51 20  5.68
Anterior parietal lobus, precuneus  (39)  -39 -71 36  6.59
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,,      ,,  (39) -50 -63 23  5.88
Cerebellum, posterior     9 -86 -21  5.00
 
Areas activated in the combined condition of positive, negative, stressful 
autobiographic memory relative to rest. .  
Region, Gyrus BA x y z z-statistics
Inferior frontal gyrus (47) -45 26 -6 Inf 
,,      ,, (47)  53 29 -7 4.79
Dorsolateral gyrus (6/8)  -6 17 42 Inf.
Superior frontal gyrus  (9/10)  -6 54 23 Inf 
,,      ,, (9)  12 60 27 6.30
Middle temporal gyrus (39) -50 -63 23 Inf
,,      ,, (21) -56 -7 -20 6.50
,,      ,, (21) -50 -35 -8 4.72
Hippocampus  (28) -18 -18 -17 Inf
Parahippocampal gyrus  (28/36)  21 -16 -27 5.52
,,      ,, (36)  27 -10 -33 5.17
,,      ,, (36)  18 -39 -26 5.35
Superior anterior temporal gyrus (38)  45 19 -31 6.78
Posterior cingulate gyrus  (23) -6 -55  13 6.92
Inferior parrietal lobe (39) -39 -68  36 Inf 
Cuneus  (17)   6 -93   2 4.69
Cerebellum   -18 -42 -23 6.94
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Cerebellum  6 -82 -18 5.76
Areas activated in the combined condition of neutral, positive, negative, stressful 
autobiographic memory relative to rest.  
Region, Gyrus BA x y z z-statistics
Inferior frontal gyrus  (47) -36 25 -6 Inf
,,      ,, (47) -45 26 -6 Inf
,,      ,, (47) 53 29 -7 6.17
,,      ,, (47) 45 26 -4 6.08 
Middle frontal gyrus/dorsol. g.  (10/ 46) -39 45 20 4.61
Superior frontal lobe  (9)  15 57 28 5.55
Middle temporal gyrus  (21) -53 -7 -22 7.46
,,      ,, (21) -48 -38  -8 5.96
Parahippocampal gyrus  (28) -18 -18 -17 6.54
Hippocampus   -27 -13 -17 5.29
Superior anterior temporal g. (38)  48 16 -28 6.10
,,      ,, (38) -39 16 -34 5.51
Anterior cingulate gyrus (32)  -6 20  42 Inf
Posterior  (23)  -6 -58  10 Inf
Inferior parietal lobe, precuneus  (39) -39 -68  36 Inf
,,      ,, (39) -48 -63  23 6.14
Posterior parietal lobe, precuneus (7) -15 -70  49 5.65
Cerebellum, posterior lobe    6 -83 -21 5.13
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All these activations were significant at a threshold of t= 4.54 with an uncorrected 
p<0.001.  
 
 
Figure 1. Relative increases in neural activity associated with negative remembrances 
(compared to rest) superimposed on MRI sections to depict the functional anatomy of the 
activations and their relationship to the underlying structural anatomy. 
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Figure 2. Relative increases in neural activity associated with positive, negative, and 
stressful remembrances (compared to rest) superimposed on MRI sections to depict the 
functional anatomy of the activations and their relationship to the underlying structural 
anatomy.  
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Behavioral Results 
The results of the questionnaire concerned with the phenomenal characteristics of 
the different types of autobiographical memory were analyzed employing a one-way 
analysis of variance (one-way ANOVA) with post-hoc Duncan-Multiple Range analysis. A 
significant effect of the conditions 1. Neutral, 2. Stress, 3. Positive and 4. Negative 
autobiographical memory was found for all the variables; emotionality F(3,332)=91.95, p 
<0.001 (df=amount of memories); intensity, F(3, 332)=20.59, p <0.001; experiential 
vividness, F(3, 329)=7.097, p <0.001; and visual detail, F(3, 330)=2.76, p<00.05 (see 
Table 3).  
Duncan's post-hoc analysis was applied to detect whether the types of 
autobiographical memory differed significantly (p<0.05) from each other with respect to 
the different phenomenal characteristics. Duncan's multiple range test involves the 
pairwise comparisons of the means of a specific variable over the different types of 
autobiographical memory and builds homogenous groups when not differing significantly 
from each other.  Homogeneous groups are indicated in the cells by the same indicators 
[(a), (b), (c), (d)] (see Table 3).  
Considering the variable emotionality, (a) negative memory was experienced as 
most emotional then came (b) positive, (c) stressful and at the end (d) neutral memory. The 
most intense type of memory was (a) positive memory, building a second homogeneous 
group with (a) negative memory. Then came stressful memory (b), whereas the least 
intense group was (c) neutral memory. In correspondence, positive memory was 
experienced as the most (a) vivid, building a homogeneous group together with negative 
and stressful memory, while (b) neutral memory was experienced as the least vivid 
memory.  
Considering the amount of visual detail in the remembering of memories, (a) 
neutral memory was associated among the memories with the highest level of detail, 
(which was due to the fact that the subjects became instructed to choose their memories 
among more daily life events, which were naturally more recent) building a group with (a) 
negative and (a) positive memory. In line with the hypothesis that stress may inhibit the 
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remembering of memories, stressful memories (b) were associated with the fewest 
remembering of detail.  
 
Table III. One-way ANOVA and Duncan Multiple Range Test results of rates on 
phenomenal characteristics over the four types of autobiographical memory (means and 
standard deviations; s.d.). 
 
  NEUTRAL STRESS NEGATIVE POSITIVE  F(3,329-332)
Emotion Mean 2.01(d) 3.9 (c) 4.8 (a) 4.4. (b) 91.95**
 s.d. 1.2 1.3 1.0 1.0 
Intensity Mean 2.4 (c) 3.3 (b) -3.7 (a) 3.9 (a) 20.95**
 s.d. 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.3 
Experiential  
Vividness 
Mean 3.5 (b) 4.0 (a) 4.2 (a) 4.3 (a) 7.097 **
 s.d. 1.4 1.3 1.1 1.1 
Visual 
Detail 
Mean 4.5 (a) 3.9. (b) 4.4 (a) 4.4 (a) 2.76*
 s.d. 1.5 1.6 1.5 1.5 
N=83-84, *=0.05%, **=0.001% Note: The letters following the means for each group 
represent the results of the Duncan Multiple Range test. Means with different letters differ 
significantly at p<0.05. 
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4. DISCUSSION 
 
This study centered on different types of autobiographic memory. Relative to rest, 
the different retrieval conditions induced significant neuronal activation patterns; the 
comparisons between the various retrieval conditions, however, did not result in 
statistically significant activations. While one could argue that the conditions - retrieving 
events with positive, negative or stress-related backgrounds - were too similar to each 
other, a more likely cause can be seen in the limited amount of memories retrieved by the 
subjects in each condition (which was due to the overall length of the experiment).  
The brain regions activated in each memory condition and the totality of the 
conditions relative to rest corresponds to the known networks supporting episodic memory 
retrieval. The activations were almost all bilateral with a preponderance to the left 
hemisphere. The principal activated regions we found were the lateral medial temporal 
lobes, including the hippocampal and parahippocampal areas, the medial, inferior and 
superior prefrontal cortex as well as the orbitofrontal cortex, the anterior and posterior 
cingulate gyrus, including the retrosplenial cortex, parietal lobes, precuneus and 
cerebellum. The active areas within the conditions share a common pattern, 
correspondending with the outcome of the review of Cabeza and Nyberg (1997) in 
episodic memory retrieval. They found despite all the differences in tasks and material, 
five relevant brain regions: prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, posterior midline 
area (including the posterior cingulate, retrosplenial, precuneus and cuneus regions), 
parietal cortex and cerebellum (see also Tulving et al., 1999; Gabrieli, 2001). Closely 
corresponding findings were also seen in a study on episodic memory retrieval, where 
activations were noted in the right lateral cerebellum, the medial and left orbitofrontal 
cortex, the anterior cingulate and the parietal region (Andreasen et al., 1999).  
The overlapping network of activations may be explainable by the common 
features in the retrieval of autobiographical memory, namely meaningfulness and the self-
referential character of each type of autobiographical memory. In comparison to neutral 
memories where the activation was seen primarily in the left prefrontal lobes, stressful 
memory activated, aside from the prefrontal engagement, the lateral temporal lobes, 
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reflecting the more experiential nature of stressful memory in comparison to neutral 
memory as we will discuss more deeply below. This is even much more so for the 
emotional types of negative and positive memory, where in comparison to stressful 
memory, not only the lateral, but also the medial temporal lobes were active, supporting 
the sensory and emotional richness of autobiographical memories. The exclusive left 
hemispheric involvement in neutral memory is consistent with its role in more "cold" 
semantic processes, whereas the inclusion of the right hemispheric engagement is 
consistent with its role in emotional processes (Markowitsch, 2003a-c; Davidson, 2002; 
Schore, 2002; Braun, et al., 2003). 
Taken together, the bilaterally rather symmetrical activation is partly in 
contradiction to the traditional HERA-concept, but corresponds to the outcome of our 
previous studies (Markowitsch et al., 2000, 2003) and that of several other studies on 
episodic memory retrieval (Andreasen et al., 1999; Conway, 2000, 2001, 2003; Maguire & 
Mummery, 1999; Piefke et al., 2003), which have led to competing theories regarding the 
contributions of the left and right hemisphere and prefrontal regions to memory formation 
and retrieval. The results of all these studies suggest that laterality within the brain is more 
complex than previously suggested, especially with respect to autobiographic memory 
processing, and that the veridificacy of existing models needs to be further nuancated and 
assessed, an issue allowing us to further specify the role of the left hemisphere in episodic 
autobiographical memory.  
 
4.1. PREFRONTAL LOBES 
 
The hypothesis that different prefrontal regions implement different functions with 
respect to long-term memory processing has been confirmed by our as well as by previous 
neuroimaging results (Buckner & Petersen, 1996; Nyberg et al., 2000; Nolde et al., 1998; 
Wagner, 1999). For memory retrieval, prefrontal activation may be evoked by processes of 
monitoring, verification and initiation (Fletcher et al., 1995; Markowitsch, 1995). 
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Inferior, medial and superior prefrontal regions were active during the retrieval of 
all four types of autobiographical memory (neutral, stressful, negative and positive) and 
(consequently) also, when combining them. Especially, the anterior medial-to-superior 
frontal lobe activation within Brodmann area 10 (BA 10), active in every memory 
condition, except neutral memory retrieval, may reflect processing of meaning consistent 
with the overall meaningfulness of (especially emotional) autobiographical recall.  
Moreover, in accordance with the self-reflecting character of autobiographical 
memory retrieval, the anterior prefrontal lobes have been associated with self-awareness 
and reflection in general (Johnson et al., 2002) and more specifically with judgment, the 
appropriateness of social interactions and planning (Prigatano & Schacter, 1991).   
The activation of the inferior prefrontal ventral cortex (BA 47) is in accordance 
with its importance in the selection of a memory of an event within associated competing 
memories, thereby filtering out irrelevant information (Jonides, 2000), as well as with its 
role in retrieval success (McIntosh et al., 1997). Activations of the medial and superior 
prefrontal cortex will be commented on under the headings of the frontodorsolateral and 
orbitofrontal cortex.  
Our finding of an important contribution of the left prefrontal lobe corresponds to 
other recent results (Conway, 2000, 2001; Nolde et al., 1998; Piefke et al. 2003, for a 
review see Lee et al., 2002) and provokes the question, whether and how the right 
hemisphere processes information differently from the left, and in what manner the left 
hemisphere contributes to the retrieval of autobiographic memories. Variables that may 
additionally contribute to the laterality effects are inherent processes such as re-
consolidation and strategic search, the global and specific experimental context and 
procedure, as well as the distinct characteristics of the stimuli - in particular emotionality 
and easiness of availability. Subject variables such as age and level of motivation have to 
be considered as well. 
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4.1.1. LEFT PREFRONTAL INVOLVEMENT 
 
Inferential and Re-consolidation Processes  
The spontaneous analysis and evaluation of the to be recalled events and feelings 
during the scan-measurements of the memory retrieval task may have evoked a stream of 
feelings, thought inferences and generalization processes which may have become a 
substrate for further encoding and re-consolidation processes of the activated information, 
processes relying centrally on the left prefrontal lobes (e.g. Buckner & Tulving, 1995; 
Cabeza et al., 2003; James, 1890; Sara, 2000; Markowitsch et al., 2003). 
 
Strategic Search 
The prefrontal lobes are especially engaged in the retrieval of autobiographical 
memory when executive functions are required (Greene et al., 1995). The highly complex 
demands of the retrieval task in combination with the high motivation and probable 
pressure subjects put on themselves may have enhanced primary search, systemic self-
cueing processes and the initiation of selection processes of an appropriate memory event.  
Correspondingly, the right prefrontal lobe has been theorized as more responsible 
for the easy or automatic activation of information, whereas the left prefrontal cortex goes 
a step further, by rehearsing specific memory characteristics initiating strategies, and 
generating cues for retrieving inactive information, all processes critical for accurate 
episodic remembering (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Ranganath et al., 2000). 
This may also explain why Fink et al. (1996) and Markowitsch et al. (2003) found 
relatively more right-hemispheric activation in comparison to our results. In both studies, 
subjects evoked their memories by listening to a whole sentence extracted from a memory 
episode they had retrieved before. In this present study, the subjects were presented with 
recall by (two) single central cue-words which leaves more freedom to choose another 
memory event, and stimulates strategic search and selection processes among competing 
responses relying on the left prefrontal cortex (Lee et al., 2000).   
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High Level of Detail  
Related to these findings is the fact that subjects reported high experiential 
vividness and high visual detail which may stimulate left prefrontal areas (Nolde et al., 
1998). Nolde and coworkers found that simple memory retrieval tasks elicit right 
prefrontal activation whereas more demanding retrieval tasks of perceptually detailed 
information elicit left prefrontal activation as well. Left prefrontal activation is thus related 
to more reflective processing and additional recall of event information. In a study of 
Ranganath et al. (2000), activation of the left anterior prefrontal cortex (BA 10/46) was 
reliably activated during retrieval trials of pictures and objects whereby activation in this 
region increased with demands to retrieve perceptually detailed information about the 
studied items.  
 
Visual Clarity and Experiential Vividness  
Neutral memory - related to a high level of reported visual detail - showed 
increased involvement of the left prefrontal cortex, whereas stressful, negative and positive 
memory - related to the report of experiential vividness - was associated with bilateral 
prefrontal and medial temporal lobe involvement and an overall participation of the left 
hemisphere across the conditions. 
These findings correspond to the results of Conway, Pleydell-Pearce, Whitecross, 
and Sharpe (2003) who found principally more left prefrontal activity associated with 
imagined events, more temporal activation related to experienced (cf. experiential) events 
and an overall activation of the left hemisphere when generating imagined and experienced 
kinds of memory.  
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4.1.2. ORBITOFRONTAL CORTEX 
 
The orbitofrontal engagement is consistent with its apparent important role in the 
retrieval of autobiographical memories (Markowitsch, 1995; Markowitsch et al., 2003; 
Piefke et al., 2003). As site of convergence for intero- and exteroceptive information, it 
receives multimodal input from all sensory cortical areas and has a unique position 
between subcortical and cortical regions, linking affect and memory (Derryberry & 
Tucker, 1992; Price et al., 1996; Goel & Dolan, 2001; Rolls, 1999, 2000). The 
orbitofrontal cortex is engaged in processes of both negative and positive emotional 
valence; in emotional responses to pleasant music (Blood et al., 1999), as well as in 
unipolar depression (see Price, 1999, for a discussion).  
Furthermore, orbitofrontal activations confirm its access to preexisting 
representations of schematic mental models, related to self and others (Teasdale et al., 
1999). A finding which is in conformity with its role in social, emotional, motivational, 
self-regulatory and autobiographical processes. The orbitofrontal cortex signalizes the 
likely value or behavioral relevance of available choices of action (Rolls, 1999; Elliot, 
Dolan, & Frith, 2000) and selects appropriate behavioral strategies (Eslinger, 1999). The 
intimate connection between emotion, memory and the self in functions such as conscious 
reflection (Wheeler et al., 1997), theory of mind attributions (Stuss et al., 2001), and those 
of self-recognition and personal identity (Keenan et al., 2000) are linked to the ventral 
frontal lobe.  
The idea of Kleist (1934) of the orbitofrontal cortex as representing the self, among 
other personality variables, and collective ego, moral actions and moral dispositions, 
finally receives late support from actual neuroimaging studies. 
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4.1.3. DORSAL PREFRONTAL CORTEX 
 
The role of the frontodorsolateral cortex in memory functions such as temporal 
order retrieval (Cabeza et al., 1997), in perception (temporal perception, order perception) 
(Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000), and in active maintenance, operating processes of verbal 
information that was already stored in memory (Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Petrides, 1998), 
may explain its generalized activation in every type of autobiographical memory and in the 
combinations of the different types of memory. The executive demands of the task may 
also be expressed in other typical dorsolateral functions such as task switching, "willed 
action", and inhibition of previously successful responses (Markowitsch, 1988; cf. Kapur 
et al., 1994). In episodic memory, the dorsolateral cortex typically has also been related to 
conceptual and spatial working memory (Goldman-Rakic, 1987). The left hemispheric 
activations found in our study may consequently reflect functions like encoding, re-
encoding and reconsolidation (Tulving et al., 1994; Nolde et al., 1998; Sara, 2000).  
 
4.2. PARIETAL LOBES  
 
The parietal lobes have a major role in various aspects of behavior monitoring and 
their medial portions are involved in mental imagery. Processes of successful memory 
retrieval may be modulated by parietal activity (Bernard et al., 2001, Fletcher et al., 1995; 
Cabeza, 2000; Wilding & Rugg, 1997). The activation of the gyri angularis (BA 39) and 
supramarginalis (BA 40) in all memory conditions, except in stressful memory, probably 
(due to its inhibiting influence: see above) may reflect the integration of stimulus 
characteristics or of relations between context and abstract symbolic representation. 
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4.3. LATERAL TEMPORAL LOBES 
 
Consistent with several functional imaging studies on episodic memory (Gabrieli et 
al., 1997; Rugg et al., 1997; Schacter et al., 1996; Eldridge et al., 2000), and 
autobiographical memory in particular (Fink et al., 1996; Markowitsch et al., 2002, 2003), 
we found generalized temporal activation, except for the condition of neutral memories. 
[For neutral autobiographic memory, activations were only found at a low threshold of 
3.09; (-36, -55, 11), (T: 5, 63) (Z=5,62)]. This activation pattern was strongly related to 
1the higher experiential richness of negative and positive memories compared to the lesser 
richness of stressful memories. 
Left temporal activations are in line with our previous research, demonstrating that 
autobiographic memory retrieval uses a network of right hemispheric ventral prefrontal 
and temporopolar regions and left hemispheric lateral temporal regions (Markowitsch et 
al., 2000, 2003). Furthermore, the observation that for language, semantic memory 
retrieval, and episodic memory encoding, left prefrontal and temporal regions are typically 
engaged (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Markowitsch, 1995), may again stress processes of re-
encoding and reconsolidation during the retrieval of episodic memory (Markowitsch et al., 
2003; Sara, 2000) - especially under emotionally rich memory conditions. That the 
temporal lobes were not active in the neutral, fact-like memory condition, suggests again 
the rich experiential autonoetic character of the retrieval of negative, positive and stressful 
memories in our study. Lateral and anterior temporal activations, especially in Brodmann 
areas 21 and 38, correspond to activations observed in previous studies on lifelike events 
and autobiographical memory (Burgess et al., 2001; Fink et al., 1996; Maguire & 
Mummery, 1999). Essential in episodic autobiographical memory is the sense of self, made 
by the mental experience of an event, or by autonoetic consciousness. The importance of 
certain brain structures in autonoetic consciousness - especially portions of the inferior 
prefrontal and the anterior temporal cortex (Markowitsch, 2003c) - is confirmed by the 
corresponding activations observed presently and previously (Fink et al., 1996; Menon et 
al., 2002).  
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4.4. MEDIAL TEMPORAL LOBES 
 
Neuroimaging studies confirm the role of the medial temporal lobes in memory and 
learning (Wagner et al., 1998; Markowitsch, 2000), the conscious successful ecphory of 
episodic events and their sensory-perceptual details (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Vargha-
Khadem et al., 1997; Conway et al., 2001). Increased activations of the medial temporal 
lobes - the hippocampus and the parahippocampus - was observed for stressful, negative, 
and positive memories as well as for the combination of all memory types together. The 
left activations correspond to those obtained in the study of Düzel et al., 1997) who found 
that episodically retrieved old items were associated with increased blood flow in the left 
medial temporal lobe. Furthermore, possible processes of re-encoding and re-consolidation 
processes may play a role here, particular in the more emotion loaded memories with the 
exception of stressful memories, for which the experienced stress may inhibit of block re-
encoding and retrieval processes (Markowitsch et al., 1999, 2000). 
 
4.4.1. HIPPOCAMPAL FORMATION 
 
Tulving and Markowitsch (1998) discussed the hippocampus proper as necessary 
for the acquisition and remembering of episodic, but not of semantic memories. 
Engagement of the hippocampus in negative, positive and combined conditions of 
autobiographic memory corresponds to its function in autobiographic information 
processing (Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Maguire & Mummery, 1999; Maguire et al., 
2000) and conscious recollection (Heckers et al., 1998). Control of this result by lowing 
the threshold to 3.09, shows that the hippocampus is slightly, though not significantly, 
activated in the stressful condition. The left sided dominance is consistent with the left 
hippocampal findings in the retrieval of autobiographical memory (Maguire & Mummery, 
1999; Maguire et al., 2000; Markowitsch et al., 2003). It may again partly be involved, 
aside from its role in verbal memory (Strange et al., 1999), in possible re-encoding and re-
consolidation processes during retrieval.  
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Furthermore, Maguire and Mummery (1999) observed enhanced activity for the 
retrieval of personally relevant, time-specific memories in the left hippocampus and left 
medial prefrontal cortex. Also, Buckner (2000) described hippocampal involvement in the 
recognition of time and context-related episodic memory, but not in other forms of 
recognition. Particularly the left hippocampal lateralization should point to context-
dependent episodic memory (Maguire et al., 1998; Burgess et al., 2001).  
 
4.4.2. PARAHIPPOCAMPAL REGION 
 
Together with the hippocampal engagement, processing of complex event 
memories likely involves the association of information from multiple brain regions. One 
such contributing region, activated in our study, is the perirhinal-parahippocampal cortex 
with its dense, reciprocal connections with the hippocampus (Gaffan & Parker, 1996; Zola-
Morgan & Squire, 1990; Lavenex & Amaral, 2000), receiving convergent input from 
association cortices of various sensory modalities.  
In our study, activations were primarily confined to the entorhinal cortex which is 
by far the largest field of the parahippocampal gyrus. Similar as in the hippocampal 
activation pattern, we could not directly observe parahippocampal activation in the 
stressful and neutral conditions, fitting the hypothesis that the limbic medial temporal 
regions are especially involved in experiential, autonoetic memories (Sarter & 
Markowitsch, 1985; Cahill et al., 1995; Burgess et al., 2001). Maguire (2001) reported 
increased effective connectivity between parahippocampal and hippocampal cortex for the 
recollection of autobiographical memory. Also in line with the complex experiential 
autonoetic character of particularly negative and positive memory, Epstein, Harris, 
Stanley, and Kanwisher (1999) obtained parahippocampal activation when subjects viewed 
complex contextual scenes such as rooms, landscapes and city streets, rather then when 
they viewed photographs of single and more simple objects.  
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4.5. ANTERIOR CINGULATE CORTEX 
 
Consistent with the present results of an overall activation of the anterior cingulate 
gyrus (BA 32), Markowitsch et al. (2003) and Lepage, Ghaffar, Nyberg, and Tulving, 
(2000) found anterior cingulate activations during episodic memory retrieval tasks 
probably as correlates of executive processes like the maintenance of episodic memory 
retrieval mode and response selection (Botvinick, et al., 2001; Cabeza & Nyberg, 1997; 
D'Esposito et al., 1998). Also other processes, attributed to the anterior cingulate region, 
such as visual imagery, arousal modulation, re-experiencing of emotion and emotional and 
behavioral inhibition processes may play a role here (Fletcher, et al., 1996; Markowitsch et 
al., 2000). The lack of activation in positive memories might be explained by the less 
executive and selective engagement that is needed to retrieve a very vivid positive episode. 
Experimental research has found that positive episodes in comparison to negative ones in 
general tend to be more elaborated and more easily accessed (Larsen, 1998).  
 
4.6. RETROSPLENIAL CORTEX 
 
The retrosplenial cortex receives input from regions importantly engaged in 
emotional processes such as perceiving and evaluating emotional stimuli. Inputs from the 
amygdala to the entorhinal cortex and from the entorhinal to the retrosplenial cortex can be 
seen as prerequisites for successful  memory processing (Van Hoesen et al., 1993; Cabeza 
& Nyberg, 1997; Düzel et al., 1999; Tulving, et al., 1999; Maguire et al., 2000; Maguire, 
2001; Gabrieli, 2001; Piefke et al., 2003; Markowitsch et al., 2003). The posterior 
cingulate area, particularly the retrosplenial cortex, was engaged in every single and every 
combined condition of our experiment, in line with the findings of Maddock's (1999) 
review, in which it was stated that the retrosplenial cortex was consistently activated when 
emotional materials were processed and remembered. Also, the life-like contextual 
(Burgess et al., 2001), the self-reflective (Johnson et al., 2002) and the familiar characters 
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(Shah et al., 2001) of autobiographical memory may add to the retrosplenial involvement 
in our study.  
Taken together, the retrosplenial cortex has recently been implicated in emotional 
salience and episodic memory and now also seems to be a hub area involved in 
autobiographical memory confirming its role as mediator between memory and affect.  
 
4.7. CEREBELLUM 
 
The role of the cerebellum is multiple, vague and inviting for exploration. Aside 
from its traditional role in motor activity control, cerebellar regions more recently were 
related to cognitive (and even emotional) tasks (Lane et al., 1998; Paradiso et al., 1999; 
Cabeza & Nyberg, 1997; Desgranges et al., 1998; Tulving et al., 1999; Wiggs, et al., 1999; 
Gabrieli, 2001; Fink et al., 1996; Fletcher & Henson, 2001; Markowitsch et al., 2003). The 
observed cerebellar activations in our study may reflect its participation in initiating and 
monitoring conscious retrieval of episodic memory, as well as the maintaining and 
coordination or ongoing updating of the entire retrieval process (Andreasen et al., 1999).  
Clinical neuropsychological data have also demonstrated that cerebellar lesions can 
produce a blunting effect (Schmahmann & Sherman, 1998), which may aid in explaining 
the cerebellar activation in conditions of positive memory retrieval. As noted before, the 
behavioral reports of our subjects showed us that positive memory is associated with the 
most vivid and intense memories, which may have stimulated cerebellar activation.  
D´Argembeau, Complain and Van der Linden (2002), who studied the 
phenomenologic characteristics of autobiographical memories behaviorally, found that 
positive autobiographical episodes were more easily accessed, and tended to be more 
elaborated and more frequently rehearsed than negative autobiographical episodes. The 
authors interpreted their findings as consistent with the general positive view most people 
possess from themselves.  
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5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
The principally activated brain regions in every single type of autobiographical 
memory overlapped considerably and constituted an interactive network of temporal and 
prefrontal lobes defined as structures of the extended limbic system connecting affect and 
cognition (Nauta, 1979; Simpson et al., 2001a, b). As in our previous work, these cortical 
structures appear to be highly important in the recall of autobiographical memory (Fink et 
al., 1996; Markowitsch et al., 2003).  
The main bilateral activations with left sided preponderance refer to enhanced 
levels of complex self-related information of a high level of experienced detailed 
imagination of multimodal contextual and perceptual qualities. The primary search and 
systematic self-cueing processes involving a detailed, deliberative analysis of activated 
information and the initiation of enhanced selection processes due to the diverse conditions 
employed in this study, have to be acknowledged here. Due to its rich contextual nature, 
autobiographical memory contains both episodic (event-based) and semantic aspects. The 
contribution of both episodic and semantic systems can contribute in parallel and with 
different weights to the actual outcome of autobiographical episodes (Tulving, 1995, 2002; 
Tulving & Markowitsch, 1998). Episodic memory retrieval may consequently benefit from 
recruiting resources of both hemispheres. A dynamic functional interaction between left 
and right hemispheric functions, and semantic and episodic processes has consequently to 
be acknowledged as contributing to autobiographical memory retrieval. Consequently, 
variables such as task demands, subject variables and contexts contribute dynamically and 
may activate both hemispheres to various degrees (Lepage et al., 2000).  
Thinking in distributed networks consequently is more than ever necessary in order 
to account for the recall mechanisms of functions as complex as autobiographical memory 
retrieval. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY, BEGINS AND ENDS WITH THE SELF 
Autobiographical Memory, Consciousness, the Influence of Stress and its Neural 
Correlates 
 
1. MEMORY, AUTONOETIC CONSCIOUSNESS AND THE SELF: Consciousness 
as a Continuum of States 
 
A renewed attempt is made for a deeper understanding of the relationship between 
memory and consciousness, relying on neurophysiological, philosophical and 
psychological concepts. Departing from the theory of Tulving (1985, 2002), about 
semantic and episodic memory and cognitive child psychology the question was posed 
how children develop awareness of themselves as someone with specific semantic 
characteristics and as someone embedded in time and space. The assumption is that 
different levels of development of the self relate to the phylogenetic development of 
different states of consciousness of being in the world. A gradual conceptual distinction is 
outlined:  1). a rudimentary state of autonomic awakeness or 'unknowing consciousness' as 
a biological adaptive function or “anoetic” consciousness relying on implicit and 
procedural memory. As a state of anoetic consciousness, a first sort of 'self-experience' or 
self-consciousness became suggested: children, already very early in development, develop 
an implicit awareness of their own organism and of its influence on the surrounding world. 
Even when they are still not capable to reflect on the perceptual origin of their own 
knowledge, they possesses already very early, implicit experiential information about 
themselves. Without this level we are not able to understand phenomena as experiencing 
oneself without explicit remembering time and space. 2) 'Knowing consciousness'; or 
"noetic", and "autonoetic" consciousness. Noetic consciousness is based on semantic 
memory without having access to subjective experience, whereas autonoetic consciousness 
is based upon a self-reflective state within time and other contextual dimensions. The 
mode of access in autonoetic consciousness is associated with what James calls 'warmth 
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and intimacy'. As a self-generated, self-knowing state, attention in autonoetic 
consciousness can be directed to the past in retrograde consciousness, the present in "real-
time" consciousness and to the future in 'prospective' consciousness. Autonoetic 
consciousness can also be (1) the explicit self-awareness, and/or (2) the explicit awareness 
of something or someone else in a specific time-space context. When attention is directed 
from the present to the past to re-experience personal past in subjective time, it makes use 
of episodic memory (Tulving, 2002).   
In the third part of the text, suggestions about the neural correlates of the 
consciousness as a continuum of states with evidence from brain damage became 
proposed. Also, evidence from lesion data suggested that an integrated prefronto-anterior 
temporal network is necessary for successful memory retrieval. Malfunctioning of these 
regions - either due to manifest tissue damage or due to psychogenic stress and trauma 
situations, disturbs self-consciousness and autonoetic consciousness.  
Due to its complexity, the higher degree of anatomical interconnectivity, 
autobiographical memory  and  associated autonoetic consciousness, is more vulnerable to 
diverse forms of focal as well as diffuse brain damage and other external and internal 
influences such as stress and neurovulnerability. Anosognosia, emotional flattening and 
indifference may be the result. Considering the conceptualizing of different levels upon a 
continuum, empirical studies will be more able to tease different levels of consciousness 
and memory apart, like unconscious and conscious level of processes and to control the 
measurements of one level in comparison with another level.  
 
2. NEUROVULNERABILITY: the Influence of Stress on Memory and 
Autobiographical Memory 
 
I argued that during early childhood intimate care-taking constitutes the most 
important prerequisite for properly experiencing and processing stress. The intimate 
interaction of a child with his or her environment is an essential prerequisite for healthy 
development of the brain and sense of life, and for handling the continuous stream of tasks 
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within the environment. Environmental influences, in particular prenatal and postnatal life 
experiences with the mother and other caretakers influence the neural and neuroendocrine 
reactivity to the demands and stressors the child meets.  
The present chapter aimed at contributing new thoughts to this topic and at 
clarifying the facets implicated in the expression neurovulnerability. In early childhood, 
brain tissue is then still in a continuous state of growth and differentiation whereby 
environmental stress may lead to long-lasting alterations in brain morphology and 
functions by reduced neuronal maturation and enhanced neuronal degeneration. As a 
result, neural networks becomes more vulnerable to further stressful influences. I suppose 
that many mental health problems share pathophysiological mechanisms originatingƒ from 
subjective discomfort, which in turn leads to enhanced neurovulnerability; a sensitivity or 
reactivity of the central nervous system at various levels -- from intracellular and 
biochemical to neurophysiological and psychological ones. Intense or chronic psychosocial 
stress may induce increased vulnerability on the neural and consequently also on the 
behavioral level, resulting in the facilitation of the subsequent development of functional 
disturbances, with psychogenic amnesia and altered autonoetic consciousness being a 
particularly poignant example.  
Future studies should further explore the mechanisms influencing just how stress 
weakens our neural networks and information processing, and which stressors have 
strenghtening effects on the healthy information processing and state of autonoetic 
consciousness of the individual.  
 
4. ENGAGEMENT OF LATERAL AND MEDIAL PREFRONTAL AREAS IN THE 
ECPHORY OF NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL MEMORY 
  
As the subset of episodic memory, episodic autobiographical memory is 
accompanied by a self-reflective mental state of consciousness or autonoetic consciousness 
(Tulving, 1985; 2002). It is directed towards the ecphory of past emotional happenings, 
usually affect-laden, either positively or negatively. Using functional magnetic resonance 
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imaging (fMRI), the question of interest was whether in addition to a likely engagement of 
frontal lobe regions other brain areas are implicated differentially in the processing of 
negative versus positive old autobiographical memories. Limbic area, like portions of the 
prefrontal/orbitofrontal cortex, the ventral striatum and the amygdala are considered to 
process emotional information (Davidson, 2000; 2002; Davidson and Irwin, 1999; 
Mesulam, 2000; Morris and Dolan, 2001). 
In this context, it is still a controversially discussed question whether the right, 
compared to the left hemisphere contributes more intensely and more directly to the 
retrieval of affect-laden memories.  
The results provided evidence for an engagement of portions of the 
orbitofrontal/ventral prefrontal cortex in the retrieval of old, emotionally colored episodes. 
These findings point to the importance of the orbitofrontal cortex for affect-laden 
information processing in autobiographical memory and autonoetic consciousness and to 
the existence of distinct neural nets for the re-activation of positively and negatively 
viewed autobiographic episodes.  
1. Comparing the retrieval of sad with that of positive episodes activated both 
lateral orbital cortices symmetrically, together with a small region in the right lateral 
temporal cortex and the left cerebellum were activated.   
2. Comparing the retrieval of positive with that of negative episodes a major left 
hippocampal and a bilateral (but more strongly right-sided) medial orbitofrontal/subgenual 
cingulate and a left dorsolateral prefrontal activation. These findings point to the 
importance of the orbitofrontal cortex for affect-laden information processing and 
associated autonoetic consciousness and to the existence of distinct neural nets for the re-
activation of positively and negatively viewed autobiographic episodes.      
 
4. BI-HEMISPHERIC ENGAGEMENT IN THE RETRIEVAL OF 
AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL NEUTRAL, STRESSFUL, POSITIVE AND NEGATIVE 
EPISODES.  
 
General Discussion 
 
 
 
 
-155- 
- 
The second study went a step further by using memories of various valences, 
positive, negative, stressful and neutral memories, and additionally, by extra requiring the 
subjects to intensely imagine their autobiographical episodes. The inclusion of stressful 
memories was considered to be important in answer upon the question how stressful 
incidents may change the activity of specific brain region by increased hormones resulting 
in the inhibition or blockade of receptor channels in memory sensitive areas. Using 
functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), this study addressed the question whether 
autobiographical memories of positive, negative, stressful, or neutral character recruit 
similar or different neural networks. Obtained results have implications for the 
classification of memory tasks with respect to systems, laterality and processes. 
Moreover, in the context of the precedent chapters, I will now re-analyse and re-
discuss this study about the retrieval of neutral, stressful, positive and negative episodes 
with as background 1). the theorizing about autonoetic consciousness, its experiential 
quality and its neural correlates, 2). the question whether the subjective phenomenal 
characteristics will help us to understand the different activations and 3). the question 
whether the ecphory of stressful memories changes the activity of specific brain regions, 
information retrieval and autonoetic consciousness. Not only uncontrollable stress when 
coping mechanisms fail, can be destabilizing but also the recall of "daily" stressful events 
may change, inhibit or even destabilize neural processing, information processing and 
autonoetic consciousness.  
The pattern of cerebral activations revealed significant results of the different 
conditions relative to rest, reflecting a pattern of shared activation of brain area. Activated 
areas that correspond to the known networks supporting autobiographic memory retrieval 
are: 1. the medial temporal lobes, including the hippocampal and parahippocampal area, 2. 
the medial, inferior and superior prefrontal cortex as well as the orbitofrontal cortex and 
the dorsolateral cortex, 3. the anterior and posterior cingulate gyrus, including the 
retrosplenial cortex, 4. parietal lobes and the precuneus and 5. the cerebellum. 
The four different types of autobiographical memory - neutral, stressful, negative 
and positive memories - were compared with each other and with rest. The overlapping 
network of activations may be explained by the common features in the retrieval of 
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autobiographical memory, namely meaningfulness and the self-referential character of 
each type of autobiographical memory. Only the most important area becomes discussed. 
 
Prefrontal Area 
Inferior, medial and superior prefrontal area were active during the retrieval of all 
four types of autobiographical memory (neutral, stressful, negative and positive) and 
(consequently) also, when combining them, reflecting their importance in autobiographical 
memory retrieval. The anterior medial-to-superior frontal lobe activation within Brodmann 
area 10 (BA, 10), however active in every memory condition, was not active in neutral 
memory retrieval, which may reflect enhanced meaningfulness of more experiential 
autobiographical memories. The prefrontal lobes are regarded as the seat of the highest 
mental functions with a central role in the representations of the self and in the capacity of 
self-reflection and attribution. Prefrontal lobes play a prominent role in higher levels of 
awareness, reflected in noetic consciousness and particular in autonoetic consciousness. As 
in the first study about positive and negative autobiographical memory, the intimate 
connection between orbitofrontal activation, emotion, memory and the self becomes 
confirmed here. The orbitofrontal cortex is also involved in evaluative processes such as 
appraisal of information (Pribram, 1987), the direction of attention toward oneself and 
content-related aspects of consciousness and memory (Goldenberg et al., 1989). 
 
Medial and Lateral Temporal Area 
In comparison to neutral memories, the more experiential memories, like stressful 
memories activated, aside from the prefrontal engagement, also the lateral temporal lobes. 
This was even much more so for the still more emotional types of negative and positive 
memory, where, not only the lateral, but also the medial temporal lobes - the hippocampus 
and the parahippocampus - were active (as well as for the combination of all memory types 
together). The role of the medial temporal lobes in memory and learning becomes 
confirmed in the conscious, successful ecphory of episodic events and their sensory-
perceptual details (Aggleton & Brown, 1999; Vargha-Khadem et al., 1997; Conway et al., 
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2001). Damage to the temporal lobes results in a failure of analysis or on-line maintenance 
of information concerning the self.  
Similar as in the hippocampal activation pattern, we could not directly observe 
parahippocampal activation in stressful and neutral conditions, fitting the hypothesis that 
the limbic medial temporal regions are especially involved in more experiential, autonoetic 
memories (Sarter & Markowitsch, 1985; Cahill et al., 1995; Burgess et al., 2001). This 
result is in line with the behavioural results, where, considering for instance, the variable 
emotionality, negative memory, and then positive memory was experienced as most 
emotional, followed by stressful memory and then neutral memory. The fact that stressful 
memories, considered by the subjects as emotional, did not activate hippocampal and 
parahippocampal area may reflect the inhibiting influence of processing stressful 
information on brain metabolism and related brain activation. In correspondence, stressful 
memories were associated with the fewest remembering of detail.  
 
Parietal Area 
Even though the parietal area is not the most specifically relevant region for 
episodic-autobiographical memory, it is interesting to observe that the gyri angularis (BA 
39) and supramarginalis (BA 40) associated with the integration of stimulus characteristics 
of relations between context and abstract symbolic representation, were active in all 
memory conditions except in stressful memories. 
 
Anterior cingulated cortex and retrosplenial cortex 
Consistent with the present results, anterior cingulated gyrus is active during 
episodic memory retrieval (Markowitsch et al. 2003) and in the representation and 
awareness of almost any stimuli (Shulman et al., 1997). The posterior cingulate area, 
particularly the retrosplenial cortex, was engaged in every single and every combined 
condition of our experiment. Life-like contextual (Burgess et al., 2001), emotional 
(Maddock, 1999), self-reflective (Johnson et al., 2002) and the familiar characters (Shah et 
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al., 2001) of autobiographical memory may have contributed to the retrosplenial 
involvement in our study. 
 
Hemispheric Laterality  
The overall left sided preponderance, also in the most emotional conditions, 
probably refers to enhanced levels of complex self-related information with high levels of 
experienced detailed imagination of multimodal contextual and perceptual qualities of the 
event. The primary search and systematic self-cueing processes, and the initiation of 
enhanced selection process due to different conditions in the study of an appropriate 
autobiographical event, have to considered here (Burgess & Shallice, 1996; Ranganath et 
al., 2000). 
The exclusive left hemispheric involvement in neutral memory is consistent with its 
role in more "cold" semantic processes and its possible enhanced level of perceptual detail 
due to the more recent character (as became clear in the debriefing) of the neutral 
memories. The inclusion of the right hemispheric engagement in stressful, negative, 
positive and combined conditions is consistent with its role in emotional processes and the 
quality of autonoetic consciousness as characterized with 'warmth and intimacy'.  
Considering the problem of episodic-autobiographical memory retrieval and 
laterality, a dynamic functional interaction between left and right hemispheric functions 
and resources, as well as semantic and episodic processes has to be considered.  
The strict left, right prefrontal laterality in the retrieval of semantic and episodic 
autobiographic memory, as we see in traditional models of emotional processing may 
largely be understood in terms of the distribution and activity of areas over the whole 
brain.  
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Final Remarks 
Both studies of autobiographical memory episodes showed activation of a temporo-
frontal network of structures. The principally activated brain regions in both studies of 
autobiographical memory overlapped considerably, and constituted of an interactive 
network of temporal and prefrontal lobes defined as structures of the extended limbic 
system linking affect with cognition. Autobiographical memory and autonoetic 
consciousness, is intimately dependent on a proper action of the described circuits, 
prefrontal, medial and lateral temporal lobes and regions.  
Psychogenic stress leads to a changed metabolism of the brain and 
neurovulnerability which may disturb autobiographical memory retrieval, self-
consciousness and autonoetic consciousness. Autobiographical memory about the own self 
or self-knowledge may then become reduced to the level of semantic knowing of 
personality characteristics or traits, accompanied by an inhibited disturbed sense of time 
and autonoetic consciousness. Feelings of warmth and intimacy, which determine the self-
related quality of autonoetic consciousness become inhibited or impaired. Evidentially, 
empirical confirmation of the neurovulnerability hypothesis needs longitudinal studies too, 
studies with large groups of subjects who had a stressful or traumatic childhood, as well as 
within-subject studies where subjects have to process stressful information before and after 
they experience something traumatic or before and after a period of traumatic stress. The 
question is whether they react differently and become more vulnerable to develop 
functional disturbances, such as changed, inhibited or blocked information processing and 
autobiographical memory. As well, the understanding of autobiographical memory and 
autonoetic consciousness needs further exploration of the fine mechanisms determining 
one level of consciousness and memory in comparison to another level of consciousness 
and memory, brain metabolism and lateralization. 
To conclude, described theorizing and studies as done in this dissertation; mean an 
exploring, renewed, and confirmatory step further in the continuing debate on 
autobiographical memory, consciousness, and its neural correlates, as well as a preliminary 
step in the understanding of the phenomenon of neurovulnerability. 
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